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Chapter 1
Introduction
Payout policy can be defined as the recurring managerial decisions and actions that
set the amount and form of payouts to shareholders. Allen and Michaely (2003, p.340)
further assume that these decisions imply “[...] some consistency over time, and that
payouts, and dividends in particular, do not simply evolve in an arbitrary and random
manner.’
While most researchers would agree on this definition of payout policy, the issue
itself remains one of the most challenging and open topics in corporate finance. Despite
an enormous amount of research, there is still no unanimity on the most fundamental
questions (Black, 1976; Allen and Michaely, 2003): Does payout policy affect the overall
firm value? How do firms set the amount and form of payout?
Most empirical research dealing with these questions has a focus on US capital
markets. However, due to the differences in the institutional setting of the US and
continental Europe it is questionable if the findings for the US can be applied to
European firms. In fact the German institutional setting exhibits some deviations
worth mentioning: First, opposed to the US, repurchases where essentially prohibited in
Germany until 1998. Second, Germany underwent a major tax reform in 2001 affecting
the relative tax advantage of repurchases over dividends. Finally, German firms operate
in a corporate governance system that substantially differs from the US (e.g. Da Silva
et al., 2004; Gugler, 2003).
The purpose of this dissertation thesis is to investigate how these changes in the
institutional setting have affected the payout policy of German firms. This dissertation
thesis further contributes to the literature on event study methodology by analyzing
the measurment of abnormal credit default swap spreads. In the following, we will
present the main ideas and concepts of this dissertation thesis.
In contrast to many theoretical studies, most empirical studies equate payout
1
policy with dividend policy. This can be explained by the fact that regular dividends
where the predominant method to disburse cash to shareholders until the mid 1980s.
However, US corporations have increasingly used share repurchases in the recent
past. Grullon and Michaely (2002) document that aggregate share repurchases exceed
aggregate dividend payments for the first time in 1999. As a reaction to the increasing
importance of share repurchases researchers have (i) analyzed how markets react to the
announcement of a repurchase program and (ii) tried to model how managers decide
on conducting a repurchase program.
It is a stylized fact, at least since the early studies by Dann (1981) and
Vermaelen (1981), that stock prices react positive to repurchase announcements.
Different hypotheses have been brought forward that try to explain these findings,
but there is still an ongoing debate about which hypotheses are consistent with the
empirical findings. Even though these empirical findings contradict the seminal Miller
and Modigliani (1961) irrelevancy theorem, the latter is a good starting point for the
identification of imperfections possibly explaining the influence of payout policy on firm
value. Since capital markets are neither perfect nor complete, payout policy interacts
with investment decisions and thereby potentially affects the market value of a firm.
Asymmetric information, principal agent conflicts and the taxation of distributions
can explain the positive stock price reaction, but also affect the managers’ decision on
changing their payout policies. This is explained in the following:
First, managers might possess private information about the true value of their
firm. According to the classical signal models brought forward by Bhattacharya (1979)
and Miller and Rock (1985) managers should adjust their payouts in order to convey
their private information to the public. In both models dividends and repurchases are
implicitly treated as perfect substitutes. If managers believe that their firm is currently
undervalued, they can either increase dividends or initiate a repurchase program. Thus,
these signalling models are a possible explanation for the positive market reaction on
repurchase announcements. The signalling models further imply that managers in firms
with higher information asymmetries are more likely to announce a repurchase (or
dividend increase) if they possess positive information on their firms’ future prospects.
Second, payout policy can be used to mitigate potential conflicts between
shareholders and managers. Jensen (1986) argues that managers might allocate funds
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to investment projects that increase the managers’ private benefits but decrease the
shareholders’ value. Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984) suggest that reducing cash
available to managers can mitigate the potential misuse of funds. Announcing a
repurchase program or a dividend increase should therefore yield to a positive market
reaction. As the management of a firm effectively sets the payout policy, this theory
lacks an explanation why managers should voluntarily disburse cash to shareholders.
A potential solution to that problem is a large shareholder possessing enough power to
enforce a value-maximizing payout policy. However, a large and powerful shareholder
should be able to monitor the management, which itself is sufficient to align the
managers’ interests. Moreover, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) argue that the existence
of a large blockholder can cause an additional agency conflict between large and small
shareholders. German firms are an interesting object to gain further insights on the
relation between ownership structure and payout policy, not least by the fact that many
German firms are more closely held than US firms.
While the aforementioned hypotheses treat dividends and repurchases as perfect
substitutes, tax-based arguments lead to the conclusion that investors can have a clear
preference for either dividends or repurchases. In the US, dividends are more heavily
taxed than capital gains. Thus, (individual) investors should have a clear preference
for repurchases over dividends. If managers care about their investors’ tax preferences,
they should substitute repurchases for dividends. In contrast to this prediction, US
corporations used dividends as their primary method of payout until the mid 1980s.
Black (1976) describes this phenomenon as the ‘dividend puzzle’.
Jagannathan et al. (2000) provide evidence that repurchases differ from dividends
not just because of a different tax treatment. In line with Lintner’s (1956) findings they
document that dividends are smoothed over time. In contrast, repurchases are much
more volatile and vary with the business cycle. They conclude that dividends are used to
disburse permanent earnings while repurchases are used to pay out temporary earnings.
This contradicts the assumption that repurchases should replace dividends because of
their relative tax advantage, but rather implies that repurchases and dividends are
complementary payout methods.
The institutional setting in Germany allows us to further investigate some
important research questions. In contrast to the US, share repurchases had almost
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entirely been prohibited before 1998. At that time US firms had already reached a
new phase of the gradual transition process from solely paying dividends to a situation
where repurchase were as important as dividends. Therefore, it is interesting to study
how German firms make use of the possibility to repurchase their own shares. In
addition to the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998, Germany underwent a major
tax reform affecting the relative tax advantage of repurchases over dividends in 2001.
These particularities of the German institutional setting allows us to shed further light
on the relation between dividends and repurchases. Especially the two aformentioned
regulatory changes are a favourable setting to test the various hypothesis against each
other.
While most empirical studies that investigate the effect of payout policy on firm
value employ an equity event study, some studies have examined the corresponding
effect on bondholders’ wealth. A central problem is that, in contrast to stocks, the event
study methodology is less developed for other assets. As a consequence, researchers
often adopt the stock event study methodology to other assets such as bonds and
credit default swaps (CDSs). In their recent paper Bessembinder et al. (2009) provide
evidence that this adoption to bonds is problematic because the related test statistics
are poorly specified and lack the power to reliably detect event-induced changes in bond
prices. A relatively new asset used in event studies originates from credit derivates. In
particular, a growing literature analyzed the effect of corporate and regulatory events
on credit default swap spreads. In contrast to bonds, research can employ CDSs to
analyze the effect of an event on credit risk. Another difference is the fact that CDS
are mainly traded by instituinal investors. Since Daniels and Jensen (2005) and Zhu
(2006) show that price discovery occurs first in the CDS market and subsequently in the
bond market, analyzing CDS is likely to provide cleaner results. Despite these and other
potential advantages of CDSs over bonds (e.g. liquidity, standardized maturities) no
guidline that describes how to conduct a meaningful event study with CDS exists. We
therefore use a large international dataset with CDS spreads to conduct a simulation
study similar to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). This allows us to evaluate the
specification and power of different spread change models and test statistics.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 (joint work
with Christian Andres, Andre´ Betzer and Erik Theissen) investigates the decision
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to announce an open market share repurchase and the share price reaction to the
subsequent announcement. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies
that analyze the decision to repurchase stock and the market reaction in a joint
econometric framework. Previous studies have either focused on the managerial decision
to announce a repurchase (e.g. Jolls, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000;
Kahle, 2002; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008; Oswald and Young, 2010; Andriosopoulos,
2010) or solely analyzed the market reaction to repurchase announcements (e.g.
Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). The
former strand of the literature emphasizes that managers decide rationally whether
or not to announce a repurchase program. The latter strand of the literature employs
the event study methodology and a subsequent cross-sectional regression to explain
abnormal returns. A potential problem with this approach is that it implicitly assumes
that the set of announcing firms is a random sample of the population of all listed
firms. If firms self-select to announce a repurchase, a simple cross-sectional regression
on abnormal returns can lead to biased results. To bridge the gap between the different
strands of the literature and to account for the potential selection bias, we employ an
econometric model in the spirit of Heckman (1979). This approach requires a “non-
event sample” of firms that could reasonably be expected to announce a repurchase but
finally did not. To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have applied this approach
to the case of share repurchases. Li and McNally (2007) use a sample of Canadian firms
that announce a repurchase program. They create their non-event sample by matching
a non-repurchasing firm to each repurchasing based on different firm characteristics
such as size and industry. They thereby assume that non-repurchasing firms that are
‘similar’ to the repurchasing firms should exhibit a non-trivial probability of announcing
a repurchase program. Schremper (2003) analyzes German firms. He does not apply
a matching approach but defines all non-repurchasing firms as the control group.
He thereby assumes that investors assign a non-trivial probability of announcing a
repurchase program to all listed firms.
However, the specific institutional rules for Germany allow us to construct a clean
sample of non-repurchasing firms. German firms that intent to conduct a repurchase
program need to follow a standardized two-step procedure. First, the shareholders’
meeting has to grant the managerial board the permission to conduct a repurchase
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program. This permission is valid up to 18 month (5 years from 2009 onwards). This
permission is basically an option because it grants the right, but not the obligation, to
conduct a repurchase program. German firms that finally conduct a repurchase program
have to disclose this fact to the public. This two-step procedure allows us to identify
repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms that intended to do so, but finally did
not.
The empirical analysis is based on 438 ad-hoc announcements published between
May 1998 and December 2008. Non-event firms are defined as firms that have a valid
approval by the shareholders’ meeting but do not make use of it. We find that the
conditional approach yields results that are qualitatively comparable but differ in detail
from those obtained using a non-conditional approach. We confirm earlier findings of
negative share price performance prior to the repurchase announcement and positive
and significant announcement day abnormal returns. The results of our probit models
are consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis and provide at least partial support
for the rent extraction, signalling and capital structure hypotheses. The results of the
cross-sectional regressions provide strong support for the signalling hypothesis once we
control for the selection bias.
Chapter 3 (joint work with Christian Andres, Erik Fernau, and Erik Theissen)
also deals with the introduction of share repurchases as an additional method to payout
cash to shareholders. The scope of this chapter is to shed further light on the relation of
repurchases and dividends as well as the effect of taxes on payout policy. We therefore
define total payout as the sum of regular dividends, special dividends, and repurchases.
Employing Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment models for dividends and total payouts,
we analyze the effect of the introduction of repurchases and a major tax reform on the
overall payout policy of German firms. Our sample covers 424 non-financial firms at
any time during the 21-year period 1988-2008. This yields an unbalanced panel with
4,363 firm-year observations.
As it is questionable whether repurchases and dividends are substitutes or
complements, we define different model specifications. We further allow for changes
in the payout policy of German firms due to the two aforementioned institutional
changes by introducing structural breaks for the introduction of repurchases and the
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2001 tax reform. If dividends and repurchases are perfect substitutes, the parameters of
a Lintner (1956) model based on total payouts should not change by the introduction of
repurchases in 1998. In contrast to this prediction, we document a substantial decrease
for the target payout ratio and an increase in the speed of adjustment. These results are
inconsistent with the hypothesis that dividends and repurchases are close substitutes.
We further investigate wether firms adjust their payout policy due to a change
in the relative tax advantage of repurchases over dividends. After the 2001 tax reform
repurchases were taxed at a lower rate than dividends. This holds for both individual
and corporate investors. We would hence expect that firms replace dividends by share
repurchases. Nevertheless, we do not observe a decrease in the target ratio of a partial-
adjustment model based on regular dividends. We therefore conclude that our results
are also inconsistent with the prediction that tax considerations are a major driver of
payout decisions.
Because our results do not support the assumption that repurchases and dividends
are substitutes, we also test the validity of the flexibility hypothesis broad forward by
Jagannathan et al. (2000). For this purpose we decompose earnings into a permanent
and a transitory component. Our results support the flexibility hypothesis, which
predicts that dividends are used to disburse permanent earnings while repurchases
are used to disburse transitory earnings.
In Chapter 4 (joint work with Andre´ Betzer and Christian Andres) we examine
the size and power of test statistics designed to detect abnormal changes in credit risk
as measured by CDS spreads. In the spirit of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and
Bessembinder et al. (2009), we follow a simulation approach to examine the statistical
properties of normal and abnormal CDS spreads and assess the performance of normal
return models and test statistics. Using daily CDS data, we find that parametric test
statistics are generally inferior to non-parametric tests, with the rank test performing
best. Some of the classical normal return models, such as the market model, are
found to be poorly specified. A CDS factor model based on factors identified in the
empirical literature is generally well specified and more powerful in detecting abnormal
performance. If factor information is not available, a simple mean-adjusted approach
should be used. Finally, we examine performance in the presence of event-induced
variance increases and bootstrapped p-values. Our inferences hold for US and European
7
CDS data and are not affected by reference entities’ credit quality.
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Chapter 2
Open Market Share Repurchases in Germany:
A Conditional Event Study Approach
2.1 Introduction
Since the early studies by Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) it is a stylized fact
that share prices react positively to the announcement of share repurchases. Academic
research has proposed a considerable number of hypotheses (to be briefly reviewed in
section 3) aiming to explain this finding, and a large number of empirical papers have
tested them.
The usual approach in these studies is to construct a sample of firms announcing
repurchases, to estimate the announcement period abnormal returns using event study
methodology, and to finally regress the abnormal returns on a set of explanatory
variables. A potential problem with this approach is that it implicitly assumes that
the set of announcing firms is a random sample of the population of all listed firms.
However, managers decide rationally whether or not to announce a repurchase program.
Evidence from empirical studies that model the decision to repurchase (e.g. Jolls, 1998;
Dittmar, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Kahle, 2002; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008;
Oswald and Young, 2010; Andriosopoulos, 2010) suggests that repurchasing firms are
systematically different from non-repurchasing firms. Similarly, the significant negative
pre-announcement abnormal returns documented in previous studies (e.g. Vermaelen,
1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) indicate that the
announcements are ‘timed’; i.e., are contingent upon the share price performance. Thus,
there is a potential selection bias.
Acharya (1988) develops an econometric methodology that corrects for the
potential selection bias. It is similar in spirit to Heckman (1979). Prabhala (1997)
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analyzes under what conditions this procedure performs well. He states (p. 32) that
this is the case ‘only when one has, in addition to data on firms announcing the event,
a set of non-event firms, that is, firms that were partially anticipated to announce but
chose not to announce the event in question’. He then concludes (p. 33) that ‘when
the necessary non-event data are available, inference should be based on conditional
methods’.
Unfortunately, non-event data is unavailable in most applications. In this regard,
the institutional rules for share repurchases in Germany are an exception. As explained
in more detail in section 2, the shareholders’ meeting first has to approve a share
repurchase program. The approval is valid for up to 18 months (up to 5 years since
2008) and allows the managerial board to initiate a repurchase program. The board is,
however, not obliged to do so. If the managerial board decides to repurchase shares this
fact is publicly announced. This two-step process allows us to construct an event sample
(firms with approval from the shareholders’ meeting that did announce a repurchase
program) and a non-event sample (firms with approval from the shareholders’ meeting
that did not announce a repurchase program).
We use this specific setup to estimate a joint model of a) the decision to initiate
a repurchase program and b) the determinants of the event date abnormal returns. We
also compare the results obtained using this conditional model to those obtained using
the traditional non-conditional approach.
We are aware of two papers that use a conditional approach to analyze the
information content of repurchase announcements. Li and McNally (2007) use a sample
of Canadian firms that announced a repurchase program (the event sample) and a
size- and industry-matched sample of non-repurchasing firms (the nonevent sample).
This sample selection procedure is based on the assumption that market participants
assign a non-trivial repurchase probability to the sample of matched firms. Schremper
(2003) analyzes German firms. He uses a sample of all non-repurchasing firms as non-
event sample. This approach implicitly assumes that the market attaches a non-trivial
repurchase probability to all listed firms.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our paper is one
of the first studies to analyze the determinants of repurchase announcements and the
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determinants of the announcement date abnormal returns jointly. Second, as outlined
above the specific institutional setting in the German stock market allow us to construct
a non-event sample of firms that already obtained shareholders’ approval to initiate a
repurchase program. With such a non-event sample at hand the conditional event study
methodology we employ is appropriate. We do not have to rely on a matched sample
approach as used by Li and McNally (2007), and neither do we have to assume that all
firms are expected to repurchase with a non-trivial probability as in Schremper (2003).
Third, we improve on the methodology used in previous papers by estimating the
first-stage probit model and the second-stage cross-sectional regression simultaneously.
This procedure increases the efficiency of the estimates. We find that the conditional
estimation approach yields results that are qualitatively comparable but differ in detail
from those obtained using a non-conditional approach. We further confirm earlier
findings of negative share price performance prior to the repurchase announcement
and positive and significant announcement day abnormal returns. The results of our
probit models are consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis and provide at least
partial support for the rent extraction, signalling and capital structure hypothesis. In
addition, the results of the cross-sectional regressions provide strong support for the
signalling hypothesis once we control for the selection bias. We find only weak support
for the free cash flow and rent extraction hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we describe
the institutional setting in Germany. In section 2.3 we develop our hypotheses. Section
2.4 describes the methodology and the data set. We present our results in section 2.5,
section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Background
Approving Repurchases
Until 1998 share repurchases were essentially prohibited in Germany.1 In 1998 a
new law came into force that allows share repurchases. Under this law firms are
allowed to buy back up to 10% of their shares. A firm wishing to buy back shares has
to follow a standardized two-step procedure. As a first step the shareholders’ meeting
(with simple majority) has to grant the managerial board the permission to buy back
shares. This permission has to specify the maximum number of shares to be bought
back (not more than 10% of shares outstanding), the minimum and maximum price
to be paid per share, and the time of validity of the permission (initially not longer
than 18 months; since 2008 no longer than 5 years).
This permission gives the managerial board the right, but not the obligation, to
buy back shares. Once the board decides to actually initiate a repurchase program the
firm has to communicate this fact to the public. This is mandated by the German
securities trading act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), which requires that listed firms
immediately disclose information that is likely to materially affect security prices (‘ad-
hoc disclosure’). Empirical studies analyzing the impact of repurchase announcements
on share prices typically use the date of the ad-hoc disclosure as the event date
(e.g. Gerke et al., 2002; Schremper, 2003; Seifert and Stehle, 2003; Hackethal and
Zdantchouk, 2006; Bessler et al., 2009).
The two-step approval procedure with the permission from the shareholders’
meeting at the first stage and the decision of the managerial board at the second
stage is important for our analysis. Our simultaneous estimation procedure requires a
control group of firms that did not initiate a repurchase program but could reasonably
be expected to do so. We choose firms that got approval from the shareholders’
meeting but did not announce a repurchase program. The managerial board of these
1Firms could acquire their own shares only under restrictive conditions (e.g. to prevent damage).
Although there is some disagreement in the literature as to the actual number of repurchases in
Germany prior to 1998 (see Seifert 2006 for a discussion) it is safe to conclude that share repurchases
were not used as a means of disbursing cash to shareholders prior to 1998.
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firms could have initiated a repurchase program at any time. Therefore, investors
would reasonably attach a non-trivial probability of announcing a repurchase program
to these firms. This claim is supported by empirical results reported in Hackethal and
Zdantchouk (2006). These authors analyze the share price reaction on the day on which
it becomes known that the management seeks shareholders’ approval for a repurchase
program. They find a positive abnormal return of 1.47% on the event date and a
cumulative abnormal return of 2.53% [5.21%] in a symmetric 3-day [11-day] window
around the event date. The result that share prices increase when the management
seeks approval for a repurchase program from the shareholders’ meeting supports
our claim that market participants attach a non-trivial probability of initiating a
repurchase program to firms that obtained approval from the shareholders’ meeting.
Implementation of Repurchase Programs
Firms are required to treat all shareholders equally. This precludes negotiated
repurchases from large shareholders. Open market repurchases, repurchase tender
offers and transferrable put rights are admissible, though open market repurchases
are the dominating form.2 As is the case in the U.S., the announcement of a share
repurchase still does not require the managerial board to actually repurchase shares.
The actual amount of repurchases is published in the firm’s financial statement.
Since 2004 new European Union regulation imposes additional restrictions on
repurchases. Individual transactions made as part of a repurchase program now have
to be reported within seven trading days. Further, there are restrictions on the prices
at which open market repurchases can be made (not higher than the price of the
previous transaction) and on the maximum daily repurchase volume (not more than
25% of the average daily volume on the market on which the trade is made).
There are two ways in which a firm can handle the repurchased shares. First, it
can treat them as an asset on the asset side of the balance sheet. They can then be
used to cover outstanding convertible bonds or executive stock options. The maximum
2Out of 589 repurchase announcements in our sample, only 17 (less than 3%) do not concern open
market repurchases.
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number of shares a firm can hold on its balance sheet is 10% of the shares outstanding.
Alternatively, the firm can reduce the number of shares outstanding. In this case the
firm’s book equity is reduced accordingly.
Tax Treatment
The tax treatment of dividends and repurchases underwent a major change in
2001. Until 2001 Germany operated a full imputation system. Dividends paid to
domestic investors were essentially taxed at the investor’s personal tax rate.3 Retained
earnings were taxed at a corporate tax rate. Consequently, investors with a personal
tax rate below the corporate rate favored dividends over repurchases while investors
with a tax rate above the corporate rate favored repurchases.4 Corporations should
have been indifferent because their ‘personal’ tax rate is the corporate rate. Foreign
investors did not receive the tax credit and may therefore have had a preference for
repurchases.
Since 2001 dividends and retained earnings are taxed at the same rate at the
corporate level. At the investor level half of the gross dividend is taxed at the investor’s
personal tax rate. Capital gains are not taxed when the shares are held for more than
one year. When this condition is met investors should thus have a clear preference for
repurchases over dividends.
In summary, while the preference for dividends versus repurchases depended on
the status (domestic versus foreign) and the personal tax rate of the investor prior to
2001, there should be a clear preference for repurchases after 2001.
2.3 Hypotheses
Starting with the seminal work of Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) a large number
of authors have empirically analyzed share repurchase programs. Three main questions
3Dividends were first taxed at the firm level. Domestic investors received the gross dividend plus a tax
credit equal to the tax paid by the firm. The gross dividend was taxed at the investor’s personal tax
rate. The resulting tax liability was then offset against the tax credit.
4This statement implicitly assumes that capital gains are not taxed. This was indeed the case when
the shares were held longer than 6 months (one year from 1999 onwards).
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are addressed in this literature: (1) why do firms repurchase shares, (2) how does the
share price react to repurchase announcements and (3) on what determinants does
the price reaction depend. The theoretical and empirical literature proposes several
hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive. We briefly discuss these hypotheses in this
section, and we summarize them in Table 2.1.
According to the signalling hypothesis, managers repurchase shares in order to
signal private information implying that the firm is currently undervalued. By this
argument, the likelihood for a repurchase should be higher for firms with lower
valuation (as measured by Tobin’s Q, the market-to-book ratio or previous share
price performance), and it should be higher when informational asymmetries between
managers and investors are more pronounced. This is likely to be the case for
smaller firms. The share price reaction caused by a repurchase announcement should
be inversely related to these measures of valuation and informational asymmetries.
Further, larger repurchase programs and repurchase announcement made by firms with
higher managerial ownership in combination with a poor stock performance should
trigger larger share price reactions because they provide more credible signals.5
The starting point of the free cash flow hypothesis is the agency conflict between
shareholders and managers. Repurchases reduce the free cash flow and may thereby
reduce agency costs. They should thus be more likely in firms in which the agency
problem is more severe. By this argument, firms with higher levels of free cash flow,
firms with fewer profitable investment opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q or
the market-to-book ratio) and firms with lower leverage should be more likely to
announce a repurchase program. The market should also react more positively to
repurchase announcements made by these firms. However, this effect may be limited
or even reversed provided that managers use a repurchase programm to finance future
acquisitions instead of reducing the firm’s equity. Moreover, the latter case is less likely
since self-interested managers may not voluntarily initiate repurchase programs that
limit their investment opportunities. Therefore, firms with large shareholders (who can
exert pressure on managers) are more likely to initiate a repurchase program.
5In case a repurchase is conducted by means of a tender offer the share price reaction should be
increasing in the offer premium. Our empirical analysis is confined to open market repurchases to
which this argument does not apply.
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The rent extraction hypothesis (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003) starts from the
observation that, in countries with concentrated ownership structures such as Germany,
there may not only be agency conflicts between shareholders and managers but also
agency conflicts between large and small shareholders (e.g. La Porta et al., 2000).
These conflicts are likely to be more pronounced when a large shareholder holds voting
rights in excess of cash flow rights. A repurchase program deprives a firm of cash
that otherwise might be diverted by large shareholders. Thus, if a firm with a strong
blockholder announces a repurchase program, the share price should react favorably
to the announcement. Consequently, the announcement date abnormal return should
increase in the stake of the largest shareholder and decrease in the cash-flow-to-voting-
rights ratio.6 By the same argument, large blockholders may be opposed to repurchase
programs. Therefore, the likelihood of a repurchase announcement should decrease in
the stake of the largest shareholder and increase in the cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio.
A large second shareholder may contain the power of the largest shareholder (see
Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). Consequently, the likelihood of a repurchase announcement
should increase in the stake of the second largest shareholder while the price reaction to
the announcement should be decreasing in the stake of the second largest shareholder.
Several hypotheses make predictions about the determinants of the choice
between dividends and repurchases. We subsume them under the header choice of
payout method. A firm’s choice of the payout method should be governed by the relative
tax treatment of dividends and repurchases and by the tax preferences of the firm’s
shareholders. As outlined in section 2 the 2001 tax reform favored repurchases over
dividends. We therefore expect a higher probability for a repurchase in the post-reform
period. Prior to 2001 investors in high tax brackets favored repurchases while those
in low tax brackets favored dividends. According to the tax clientele hypothesis one
would therefore expect firms with high dividend yields to predominantly have investors
in low tax brackets and firms with low dividend yields to have investors in high tax
brackets. As the latter investors favor repurchases over dividends we thus expect an
inverse relation between dividend yield and the probability of a repurchase.
6A low cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio indicates deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle.
Consequently, the higher the cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio the better aligned are the incentives
of small and large shareholders.
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Jagannathan et al. (2000) provide evidence that dividends are paid out of
permanent cash flows while repurchases are paid out of transitory cash flows. Firms
with more volatile cash flows are more likely to experience transitory changes in cash
flows and should thus be more likely to repurchase shares. This argument implicitly
assumes that managers prefer to smooth dividends. If a firm - for whatever reason -
prefers not to smooth its dividends, there is no reason for this firm to use repurchases
to disburse transitory cash flows. Consequently, we expect that firms with a history of
volatile dividends are less likely to initiate a repurchase.
Managerial stock options are typically not dividend-protected. Consequently,
their value decreases when a firm pays dividends. Managers in firms with stock option
plans may therefore prefer repurchases over dividends (Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 2002). As
noted earlier, repurchased shares can be used to service existing stock-option plans.
Since repurchases conducted with this intention do not signal positive information,
repurchase announcements made by firms with stock option plans should trigger lower
abnormal returns.7
The capital structure hypothesis posits that repurchases may be used as a means to
adjust a firm’s capital structure to its target level. Accordingly, firms with below-target
leverage levels should be more likely to announce a repurchase (Hovakimian et al.,
2001). To the extent that firm value depends on the distance between the actual and the
target capital structure the abnormal return triggered by a repurchase announcement
should be increasing in this distance.
Survey evidence presented by Brav et al. (2005) suggests that managers are
concerned about earnings per share (EPS). We therefore include earnings per share
in our empirical model. As there is no economic rationale for the EPS hypothesis we
do not expect a particular sign for the coefficient.
7Unfortunately, data on the existence of stock option plans is unavailable for our sample. We are
therefore unable to test this hypothesis empirically.
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2.4 Methodology and Data
The objective of our regression analysis is a joint estimation of (a) the likelihood to
initiate a repurchase program and (b) the determinants of the event date abnormal
returns. Step (b) requires event study cumulative abnormal returns as an input.
Therefore we first describe the event study that we perform. We then describe the
joint conditional estimation approach we employ. While doing so we also discuss the
traditional non-conditional approach and highlight its potential disadvantages. The
final subsection describes our data set and presents descriptive statistics.
Event Study
We measure the stock price reaction to open-market repurchase announcements
applying standard event-study methodology. The abnormal return of firm i on day τ
is defined as the difference of the realized return and the expected return based on the
market model (Brown and Warner, 1985):8
ARi,τ = Ri,τ − (α̂i + β̂iRm,τ ) (2.1)
where ARi,τ is the abnormal return of firm i on day τ and Rm,τ is the return of the
proxy for the market portfolio on day τ . The coefficients α̂i and β̂i in equation (2.1)
are OLS estimates obtained from a regression of firm i’s daily returns on the market
portfolio (and a constant) over a period of 160 trading days ending 21 days before the
announcement. We use the CDAX index as our proxy for the market portfolio.
Daily average abnormal returns are then calculated for each day of the event
period as the cross-sectional arithmetic mean of the abnormal returns:
AARτ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,τ (2.2)
where N is the total number of firms in the sample. The cumulative average abnormal
8In an unreported robustness check we alternatively use the constant mean return model. The results
are virtually identical.
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return from day τ1 to day τ2 is given by:
CAARτ1,τ2 =
τ2∑
τ=τ1
AARτ (2.3)
We test the statistical significance of AARs and CAARs applying a simple time-
series test (Brown and Warner, 1985). Since deviations from the iid normal assumption
of the aforementioned test are highly likely in event studies, we additionally apply
various robust test statistics. We calculate the Patell (1976) standardized residuals
test that is robust to heteroscedastic event-period abnormal returns. Moreover, we
apply the standardized cross-sectional test introduced by Boehmer et al. (1991) that is
additionally robust to event-induced variance increases. In case of non-normality of the
abnormal returns the former three parametric tests may be poorly specified. Therefore,
we also apply the non-parametric Corrado and Zivney (1992) rank test and the Cowan
(1992) generalized sign test.
We additionally measure the abnormal trading volume applying the methodology
described in Brav and Gompers (2003). We expect that the abnormal trading volume
is virtually zero over the pre- and post-announcement periods, but significantly
increases during the announcement period.
The conditional estimation approach
The traditional approach to analyze the determinants of the event study CARs
is to regress individual abnormal returns on a set of explanatory variables using OLS.
The corresponding cross-sectional regression equation can be written as:
CARi = Xiβ + i (2.4)
where CARi denotes the cumulative abnormal return of event i, Xi is a vector of
explanatory variables, and i an error term assumed to be normally distributed.
The traditional approach implicitly assumes that the sample of firms announcing
a repurchase is a random sample from the population of all listed firms. However,
provided that the shareholders’ meeting has granted permission to buy back shares
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managers decide rationally on whether or not to announce a repurchase. In order to
account for the resulting selection bias we adopt the general selection model proposed
by Acharya (1988) and analyzed in detail by Prabhala (1997). The cross-sectional
regression is augmented by a selection equation that models a firm’s decision whether
or not to announce a repurchase. Managers are assumed to announce a repurchase
(REPi = 1) when the marginal utility U
∗
i of doing so is strictly positive. Otherwise
they do not announce a repurchase (REPi = 0). U
∗
i is modeled as a linear function of
exogenous, publicly observable variables Wi:
U∗i = Wiγ + ηi (2.5)
where ηi is an error term assumed to be normally distributed and orthogonal to
Wi. Since market participants only observe the binary outcome REP, and since
announcement day abnormal returns are only observed for announcing firms, we finally
obtain the system:
REPi = 1⇔ U∗i = Wiγ + ηi > 0 (2.6)
REPi = 0⇔ U∗i = Wiγ + ηi ≤ 0 (2.7)
CARi = Xiβ + i if REPi = 1 (2.8)
Estimation of the selection model requires a sample of event firms (firms that announced
a repurchase) and a sample of non-event firms.
When estimating the abnormal return equation (2.8) we explicitly account for the
fact that the dependent variable (the CAR following the repurchase announcement) is
only observed for the subsample of repurchasing firms. In order to demonstrate under
which circumstances the traditional approach leads to inconsistent estimates we take
the conditional expectation of equation (2.8).
E [CARi | REPi = 1] = Xiβ + E [i | REPi = 1] = Xiβ + E [i|ηi > −Wiγ] (2.9)
Following Heckman (1979) we further assume that i and ηi follow a bivariate normal
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distribution:
ηi ∼ N(0, 1)
i ∼ N(0, σ)
corr(ηi, i) = ρ
(2.10)
Given this assumption we can express the expected value of i given ηi as:
E [i | ηi > −Wiγ] = ρσE [ηi | ηi > −Wiγ] = ρσ φ(Wiγ)
Φ(Wiγ)
= ρσλi(Wiγ) (2.11)
Inserting equation (2.11) into equation (2.8) yields:
E[CARi | REPi = 1] = Xiβ + ρσλi(Wiγ) = Xiβ + βλλi(Wiγ) (2.12)
A comparison of equation (2.12) with equation (2.4) shows that applying the traditional
approach leads to inconsistent estimates whenever the error terms of the selection model
and the abnormal return equation are correlated.
Heckman (1979) argues that self-selection can be interpreted as an omitted
variable problem. He therefore proposes a two-step estimator for eqs. (2.6)-(2.8). In
a first step he estimates the selection equation by means of a probit model. He then
calculates the fitted correction factor, the inverse Mill’s ratio:
λ̂i(Wiγ) =
φ(Wiγ̂)
Φ(Wiγ̂)
(2.13)
Finally, he estimates the parameters of the abnormal return equation with the fitted
correction factor as an additional explanatory variable. The second-stage regression is
then estimated by least squares. Assuming bivariate normality, this approach yields
consistent estimates. However, a joint estimation of eqs. (2.6)-(2.8) using maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation results in more efficient estimates and allows to test if the
correlation coefficient ρ is significantly different from zero.
So far we have treated self-selection as a purely econometric issue. However, Li
and Prabhala (2007) emphasize the ‘dual nature’ of the inverse Mill’s ratio. In our
self-selection mechanism we assumed that is the part of U∗i that is not explained by
the publicly observable regressors Wi. Because ηi is an error term orthogonal to the
22
publicly observable regressors Wi we can interpret it as private information of the
managers. From the point of view of investors who cannot observe the managers’
private information, the unconditional expected value of ηi is zero. When investors
observe that a firm announces a repurchase, they can update their expectation of the
managers’ private information ηi. This private information revealed by the repurchase
announcement should affect the stock price reaction to the announcement. We can test
whether this is the case by including E [ηi | REPi = 1] as an additional explanatory
variable in the abnormal return equation (2.4). According to equation (2.13) this
additional variable is equivalent to the inverse Mill’s ratio. Hence, a correction for
self-selection coincidently allows to test for the influence of private information on
announcement period abnormal returns. If the managers’ private information that
affected their decision to initiate a repurchase program is at least partially revealed
by the repurchase announcement, we expect a positive relation between the private
information and the event period abnormal return.
Data and descriptive statistics
In this section, we provide a description of the sample selection and event identification
process. To analyze the decision to initiate a repurchase program and to quantify the
share price reaction after the subsequent announcement, we consider all non-financial
firms included in the German Composite DAX index (CDAX).9 Our sample period
extends from May 1998 to December 2008.
As outlined above, our methodology requires a sample of firms announcing
a repurchase program and an additional sample of firms that could reasonably be
expected to announce a repurchase program but did not. To construct these two
samples, we apply the following criteria throughout our analyses. First, we only
consider firms with a valid approval of the shareholders’ meeting that allows the
managerial board to initiate a repurchase program. These approvals have to be
reported both in the annual reports and have to be filed with the ‘Bundesanstalt fuer
9The CDAX is a broad stock index that contains all German firms listed in the two major market
segments ‘General Standard’ and ‘Prime Standard’
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Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht’ (BaFin).10 The BaFin maintains a database of reported
approvals. We use this database as our starting point. Because it is incomplete, we
hand-collect additional cases from annual reports.
In a second step we divide all firms with a valid approval into a sample
of repurchasing and a sample of non-repurchasing firms. A firm is identified as a
repurchasing firm if it publicly announces the initiation of a repurchase program
through an ad-hoc disclosure announcement. We collect the announcements from
the electronic databases of DGAP11, Euroadhoc12, and firms’ websites. We obtain
announcement dates and timestamps. This procedure results in an initial sample of
589 announcements. We exclude 17 announcements that relate to non-open-market
repurchases. To avoid biases induced by confounding events we further exclude 134
announcements where other price-relevant information is disclosed during the event
period. The remaining 438 announcements made by 238 different firms constitute our
sample of repurchasing firms. Firms often state explicit reasons for the repurchase
program in the announcement. Results of previous research (Gerke et al., 2002; Seifert
and Stehle, 2003; Hackethal and Zdantchouk, 2006) suggest that the stated reason has
an impact on the share price reaction to the announcements. We therefore record the
stated reasons and code them into a set of dummy variables.13 These are included in
the abnormal return equation.
In a final step we randomly assign a non-repurchasing firm to each firm
announcing a repurchase program. The non-repurchasing firms are selected from the
population of firms that possess an approval from the shareholders’ meeting but did
not announce a repurchase program during the whole period for which the approval
was valid. Information for the matched firm is recorded on the day on which the event
firm made its repurchase announcement.
Additional data is obtained from various sources. We collect share price data,
trading volume, and annual accounting data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. All
10The Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), the German analogue to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, is the federal authority charged with the supervision of securities trading.
11DGAP- ‘Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Ad-hoc PublizitA˜¤t mbH’: www.dgap.de
12Euroadhoc: www.euroadhoc.com
13We use the categories ‘underperformance’, ‘excess cash’, ‘capital structure’, ‘acquisition’ and ‘stock
option program’. Firms that do not state a reason in their announcements (all remaining) are the base
case.
24
book values are as of the fiscal year before the announcement, whereas market values
are based on the third trading day before the announcement. Following Comment
and Jarrell (1991) and Bessler et al. (2009) we measure individual past share price
performance over the 50 trading days ending on the third trading day before the
announcement.
The free cash flow hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis predict that
the ownership structure of a firm potentially affects the likelihood of a repurchase
announcement as well as the share price reaction to such an announcement. We
therefore collect data on disclosed holdings of voting shares for the two largest
shareholders from Hoppenstedt Aktienfuehrer.14 We further calculate the ratio of cash
flow rights to voting rights for the largest shareholder. This variable proxies for
deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle.
Table 2.2 provides a detailed description of all explanatory variables we use in our
regressions. Table 2.3 contains descriptive statistics for the event firms and the non-
event firms. The event firms have lower market-to-book ratios, higher free cash flows,
are less leveraged and have less concentrated ownership (as evidenced by a slightly lower
share of the largest shareholder). There are no significant differences with respect to
share price performance, size, and dividend yield.
14We only consider shareholdings larger than 5% since this is the legal reporting threshold for the most
part of our observation period. German listed firms typically exhibit a complex structure of corporate
ownership. Pyramiding and cross ownership as well as the use of dual-class shares can induce a wedge
between cash flow and voting rights. Hence, we do not rely on shareholdings on the first-tier but follow
the procedure proposed by Da Silva et al. (2004) to identify the ultimate controlling shareholder. Based
on this methodology, the ultimate controlling shareholder is situated at the first-tier if (i) there is no
shareholder holding at least 25% of the voting shares, or (ii) the largest shareholder holding more
than 25% is a bank, insurance company, the German state, a foreign company or institution, or a
family/individual. In all other cases, the ultimate controlling shareholder is said to be at a higher tier
which is reached if criteria (i) or (ii) are satisfied. If a widely held firm is reached at a higher layer,
the ultimate control lies with this corporation. In order to track shareholdings from the first-tier to
ultimate controlling levels we use (in addition to the Hoppenstedt Aktienfuehrer) Commerzbank-Wer
gehoert zu Wem, a publication on ownership of German firms.
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Table 2.2: Description of Key Variables
Table 2.2 provides an overview of our key variables and their definitions.
Variable Definition
Market-to-book ratio The market value of equity plus debt to the book value of assets of the
fiscal year prior to the announcement. The calculation is based on market
values 3 trading days before the announcement.
Share price performance The share price performance is measured by individual buy-and-hold
returns over the 50 day period ending 3 trading days prior to the
announcement.
Firm size The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in the fiscal year before
the repurchase announcement.
Free cash flow The free cash flow is defined as EBIT + depreciation - taxes + delta def.
taxes - minority interest - interest - dividends + extra items.
Cash holdings The firm’s cash and cash equivalents relative to the firm’s total assets. All
items are based on the fiscal year before the repurchase announcement.
Ownership concentration The Herfindahl index of the firm’s ownership structure.
Leverage The difference of the firm’s market leverage ratio and the median ratio
of the corresponding industry.
Stake of largest shareholder The voting rights of the largest ultimate owner (> 5%).
Stake of second largest shareholder The voting rights of the 2nd largest ultimate owner (> 5%).
Cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio The cash flow to voting rights ratio is calculated for the ultimate
controlling shareholder.
Managerial ownership The cumulative voting rights of the managerial board members (> 5%).
2001 Tax reform dummy Dummy variable that obtains a value of one for announcements made
after the 2001 tax reform.
Dividend yield The firm’s dividend per share divided by the share price three trading
days before the announcement.
Volatility of cash flows The standard deviation of operating cash flows over the past five years.
Volatility of dividends The standard deviation of cash dividends over the past five years.
Earnings per share The firm’s earnings per share on a diluted (adjusted) basis.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Event and Non-event firms
Table 2.3 provides summary statics for the main characteristics of all event and non-event
firms. Each sample consists of 438 observations. Tests of difference give the test statistics
for the T-test and Wilcoxon rank test.
Event firms Non-event firms Tests of difference
Mean Median Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon
Mrket-to-book ratio 2.13 1.49 2.67 1.70 2.34∗∗ 2.48∗∗
Share price performance −0.07 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02 1.25 1.39
Firm size 12.33 12.00 12.47 11.83 0.95 −0.48
Free cash flow 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 −2.10∗∗ −2.95∗∗∗
Leverage 0.00 −0.02 0.05 0.02 3.53∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗
Stake of largest shareholder 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.37 2.71∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗
Dividend Yield 2.24 1.39 2.65 1.30 1.01 0.10
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%
2.5 Results
We present and discuss our empirical results in three steps. We start by presenting the
results of the probit model. We then describe the results of our event study and finally
those of the cross-sectional regression. The objective of the discussion is twofold. First,
we wish to analyze whether our conditional approach yields results that are different
from those obtained using the traditional approach. Second, we are interested in the
economic motives underlying the repurchase decision and in the determinants of the
share price reaction to the repurchase announcement.
Probit model - the decision to repurchase
The results of the probit models are shown in Table 2.4. The column labelled
‘Probit’ reports the results that we obtain when we estimate the probit model
separately. The column labelled ‘ML’ contains the results that we obtain when we
estimate the probit model and the cross-sectional regression jointly. The two sets
of results are qualitatively similar. We find that the probability for a repurchase is
decreasing in the market-to-book ratio and in leverage, and is increasing in the free
cash flow, the interaction between cash holdings and the low market-to-book dummy,
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and the cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio. We further find that the component stocks of
the high-technology index Nemax are more likely to initiate a repurchase.
Table 2.4: Selection Equation (First-Stage Regressions)
Table 2.4 contains the regression result of the determinants of the decision to
repurchase. Results are reported for the probit model and the joint maximum
likelihood estimation (ML). In addition to our key analyses variables we employ
industry (based on the ICB classifications) and year dummies. T-statistics are based
on cluster-robust standard errors.
Probit ML
Market-to-book ratio −0.0384∗∗∗ −0.0426∗∗∗
Share price performance −0.1015 −0.1575
Firm size 0.0259 0.0287
Free cash flow 0.7671∗∗ 0.5946∗∗∗
Cash holdings 0.2020 0.4638
High Cash holdings x Low market-to-book ratio 0.2974∗∗ 0.2565∗∗∗
Ownership concentration −0.1606 −0.0145
Cash holdings x ownership concentr. −0.0464 −0.0097
Leverage −0.6890∗∗∗ −0.6975∗∗∗
Stake of largest shareholder −0.2727 −0.2751
Stake of second largest shareholder 0.1212 0.4065
Cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio 0.8487∗ 0.8232∗∗
2001 Tax reform dummy −0.0654 −0.1101
Dividend yield −0.0044 −0.00462
Volatility of cash flows −0.0778 0.0019
Volatility of dividends 0.0028 −0.0081
Earnings per share −0.0046 −0.0047
Nemax 0.2838∗ 0.3213∗∗
Constant −0.1015 −0.0583
#Obs. 876 876
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%
The variables included in the probit model proxy for the signalling hypothesis,
the free cash flow hypothesis, the rent extraction hypothesis, the choice of payout
method hypothesis and the capital structure hypothesis. Table 2.5 visualizes the results
in a way which facilitates their interpretation. It shows the competing hypotheses, the
independent variables which proxy for them, their expected sign and the actual results.
These results are consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, which correctly
predicts that the repurchase probability depends positively on the free cash flow and
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the interaction between cash holdings and the low market-to-book dummy and depends
negatively on the market-to-book ratio and leverage. The result that the repurchase
probability is positively related to the cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio is consistent with
the rent extraction hypothesis. The evidence with respect to the signalling and capital
structure hypothesis is difficult to interpret because the negative coefficients on the
market-to-book ratio and the leverage ratio are also predicted by the free cash flow
hypothesis. We find no support for a choice of repurchases that is motivated by the tax
system or the tax preferences of the firm’s shareholders.
Table 2.5: Expected and Actual Results (Selection Equation)
Table 2.5 shows the competing hypotheses, the independent variables which proxy for them,
their expected sign and the actual results for the first-stage regression. An actual result that
is conform to its prediction is denoted by a ‘X’. A deviation from the prediction is denoted
by an ‘X’. Statistically insignificant parameters are denoted by a ‘0’.
Hypothesis Variable Expected sign Probit ML
Signalling Tobin’s q / Market-to-book ratio - X X
Share price performance - 0 0
Firm size - 0 0
Free cash flow Free cash flow + X X
Cash holdings + 0 0
Tobin’s q / Market-to-book ratio - X X
Cash holdings x Low market-to-book ratio + X X
Ownership concentration + 0 0
Cash holdings x ownership concentr. + 0 0
Leverage - X X
Rent extraction Stake of largest shareholder - 0 0
Stake of second largest shareholder + 0 0
Cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio + 0 X
Choice of payout method 2001 Tax reform dummy + 0 0
Dividend yield + 0 0
Volatility of cash flows + 0 0
Volatility of dividends - 0 0
Capital structure Leverage - X X
Earnings per share Earnings per share ? 0 0
29
Event study results
The event study results are shown in Table 2.6 and Figure 2.1. Consistent with
the previous literature we find large positive abnormal returns. The event day
abnormal return is 3.21% and is significant at better than the 1% level. The three-day
cumulative abnormal return is slightly larger at 3.55% and is also highly significant.
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 the trading volume is abnormally high on the event
day (at more than 250% of its normal level) and stays at an elevated level for about
eight trading days.
Table 2.6: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
Table 2.6 presents the average abnormal returns (AAR) on the announcement date and
the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for different periods. Panel A contains
the CAARs of different pre announcement periods, Panel B focuses on periods centered
on the announcement day, and Panel C reports results for the post announcement period.
Abnormal returns are calculated applying the market model. The market index is the CDAX
performance index. The estimation period ranges from τ = −181 to τ = −21.
(τ, τ) CAAR pos:neg t-test Patell Z BMP Corrado Gen. Sign
Panel A:Pre Announcement Windows
(-20;-3) −2.73% 168:270 −3.78∗∗∗ −5.52∗∗∗ −4.61∗∗∗ −2.75∗∗∗ −3.90∗∗∗
(-10;-3) −1.64% 177:261 −3.49∗∗∗ −4.52∗∗∗ −3.83∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗∗ −3.04∗∗∗
Panel B: Announcement Windows
(-2;2) 3.45% 293:145 8.42∗∗∗ 10.62∗∗∗ 8.12∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗ 8.06∗∗∗
(-1;1) 3.55% 317:121 9.42∗∗∗ 14.93∗∗∗ 11.14∗∗∗ 6.74∗∗∗ 10.26∗∗∗
(0;0) 3.21% 341:097 12.52∗∗∗ 22.53∗∗∗ 12.86∗∗∗ 10.24∗∗∗ 12.65∗∗∗
Panel C: Post Announcement Windows
(3;10) 0.92% 225:213 2.13∗∗ 2.14∗∗ 2.15∗∗ 1.54 1.55
(3;20) 0.55% 223:215 0.94 0.80 0.86 1.22 1.36
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%
Consistent with previous results we find significantly negative abnormal returns prior
to the event date. In the 18 [8] day window extending from day -20 [-10] until day -3,
the cumulative abnormal return is -2.73% [-1.64%], significant at the 1% level. This
pattern is consistent with timing attempts. Managers announce a repurchase after a
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period of negative share price performance. If such timing occurs, the occurrence of
the event (the repurchase announcement) is non-random, and a conditional estimation
approach is warranted.
Figure 2.1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
Figure 2.1 depicts the cumulative average abnormal return for open market repurchase
announcements over the 41 day period (-20; 20). Abnormal returns are calculated
applying the market model. The market index is the CDAX performance index. The
estimation period ranges from τ = −181 to τ = −21. Abnormal trading volume is
calculated as described in Brav and Gompers (2003).
Cross-sectional regression
The results of the cross-sectional regression are shown in Table 2.7. The column
labelled ‘LS’ shows the results of a simple OLS regression without correction for the
selection bias. The column labelled ‘Heckman’ displays the results that we obtain
when we estimate the cross-sectional regression separately but include the Mill’s ratio
from the first-stage probit model as an additional explanatory variable. The column
labelled ‘ML’ contains the results of the simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation.
The results of the three models are qualitatively similar in many respects. However
there are differences in detail which are worth mentioning. These differences lead
us to other interpretations in the identification of potential value drivers after the
announcement of open market share repurchases. Most importantly, the stake of the
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Table 2.7: Abnormal Return Equation (Second-Stage Regressions)
Table 2.7 presents the results on the determinants of abnormal returns for repurchase
announcements. Abnormal returns are calculated for the single announcement day. In
addition to our key analyses variables we consider the reasons stated by repurchasing
firms within their ad-hoc messages. Moreover, we employ industry (based on the ICB
classifications) and year dummies. T-statistics are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
LS Heckmann ML
Reason ‘underperformance’ 0.0097 0.0094 0.0089
Reason ‘excess cash’ 0.0172 0.0173∗ 0.0175∗
Reason ‘capital structure’ −0.0066 −0.0067 −0.0062
Reason ‘acquisition’ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
Reason ‘stock option program’ −0.0007 −0.0003 −0.0007
Market-to-book ratio −0.0003 −0.0003 0.0005
Share price performance −0.0217∗∗ −0.0199∗ −0.0204∗∗
Managerial ownership −0.0161 −0.0159∗ −0.0181∗∗
Managerial ownership x Share price performance −0.3193 −0.0323∗ −0.0333∗∗
Firm size −0.0016 −0.0020 −0.0019
Free cash flow 0.0297 0.0211 0.0180
Free cash flow x Reason ‘acquisition’ −0.1221∗∗∗ −0.1233∗∗∗ −0.1189∗∗∗
Cash holdings 0.0146 0.0081 0.0083
High Cash holdings x Low market-to-book ratio 0.0001 0.0040 0.0078
Leverage 0.0064 0.0190 0.0036
Stake of largest shareholder 0.0207 0.0272 0.0283∗∗
Stake of second largest shareholder 0.0286 0.0207 0.0214
Cash-flow-to-voting-rights ratio 0.0214 0.0244 0.0145
Earnings per share −0.0018∗ −0.0017∗ −0.0017
Nemax 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
Constant 0.0155 0.0014 0.0343
Mill’s ratio − 0.0281∗∗∗ −
Standard error σ − − 0.0506∗∗∗
Correlation ρ − − 0.5623∗∗∗
#Obs. 438 438 876
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%
largest shareholder and the interaction term between managerial ownership and share
price performance are insignificant in the LS model but turn significant once we control
for selection bias. Furthermore, the coefficient on the Mill’s ratio as proxy for the private
information of managers is significant in the Heckman and the ML estimation. In the
sequel we present and discuss the results of the ML estimation.
32
The CARs are significantly negatively related (minimum 5%-level) to the prior
share price performance, to managerial ownership, the interaction term between
managerial ownership and share price performance, and the interaction term between
free cash flow and reason ‘acquisition’ dummy. Repurchase announcements by firms
that are included in the high-tech index Nemax trigger higher CARs. With respect to
the self-reported repurchase reasons we find that the CARs are larger when the firm
announces that it repurchases shares because the management want to use the raised
money to finance future acquisitions. Furthermore, firms that are controlled by large
blockholders exhibit significantly higher returns after repurchase announcements.
Table 2.8 (constructed in the same way as Table 2.5 above) is intended to facilitate the
interpretation of our results. Our main finding is that once controlling for selection bias,
the results provide strong support for the signalling hypothesis. The negative coefficient
on the prior share price performance as well as the negative coefficient on the interaction
term between managerial ownership and share price performance support the signalling
hypothesis. We use the interaction term between managerial ownership and share
price performance because when we employ simply managerial ownership as proxy
we cannot distinguish the following two opposing effects: On the one hand, the signal
on undervaluation seems to be more credible when the management owns a greater
fraction of the shares. However, on the other hand, a greater managerial ownership
could also mitigate potential agency problems and therefore reduce potential benefits
of the repurchase to that end. Therefore, the more appropriate test for signalling
credibility is in our view a test of the interaction term of underperformance and
managerial ownership. The support for the signalling hypothesis is corroborated by
the fact that the coefficient on the Mill’s ratio in the Heckman model is positive and
significant. As discussed in section 4, this finding can be interpreted in two different
ways. First, in the original spirit of the Heckman approach, it indicates that the sample
of firms announcing a repurchase is not random. Put differently, there is selection bias.
Second, the significant coefficient implies that the repurchase announcement reveals
private information (previously only held by the managers of the firm) to investors.
As is apparent from equation (2.9) above, the coefficient on the Mill’s ratio is
the product of the standard deviation of the error term i and the correlation between
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the error terms in the probit model and the cross-sectional regression. The joint ML
estimation approach allows us to decompose the coefficient into these two components
and to separately test them for statistical significance. The results, reported in the
third column of Table 2.7, indicate that both components are significant. As discussed
in section 4 the significant correlation implies that the parameter estimates of the
traditional (i.e., non-conditional) cross-sectional regression are inconsistent.
Furthermore, the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term
between free cash flow and reason ‘acquisition’ dummy and the positive and significant
coefficient on the variable stake of largest shareholder lend partial support to the free
cash flow and the rent extraction hypotheses. The latter finding cannot be confirmed
by the LS and the Heckman specifications.
Overall, we can summarize that using a conditional estimation approach in the
context of repurchase announcements lead not only to more efficient estimates but also,
at least to a certain extent, to the identification of different value drivers.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we jointly analyze the decision to announce an open market share
repurchase and the share price reaction to the announcement. We use a conditional
estimation approach. This approach takes into account that the repurchase decision is
made rationally and that, consequently, there is a potential selection bias.
According to Prabhala (1997, p. 32) a conditional approach is warranted ‘when
one has, in addition to data on firms announcing the event, a set of non-event firms,
that is, firms that were partially anticipated to announce but chose not to announce
the event in question’. The institutional rules for share repurchases in Germany allow
us to construct such a non-event control sample. The shareholders’ meeting first has
to approve a share repurchase program. The approval allows the managerial board to
initiate a repurchase program but does not require it to do so. This two-step procedure
allows us to construct an event sample (firms with approval from the shareholders’
meeting that did announce a repurchase program) and a non-event sample (firms with
approval from the shareholders’ meeting that did not announce a repurchase program).
Our results demonstrate that a conditional estimation approach (which is
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preferable from a theoretical point of view) yields results that are qualitatively
comparable but differ in detail from those obtained using a non-conditional approach.
Most importantly, we find strong support for the signalling hypothesis once controlling
for the selection bias. We therefore conclude that a conditional approach should be used
whenever the requirements (i.e., the existence of a suitable non-event control group)
are met.
Of course one could take an alternative point of view here and argue that the
differences we document are not important enough to merit the additional complexity
of the conditional estimation approach. Irrespective of the point of view, though, our
paper makes one important contribution. It considers a setting that is well-suited for
the (theoretically superior) conditional approach and documents how the results of
the traditional and the conditional approach differ. This enables researchers to make a
more informed choice of methodology.
Our event study results confirm earlier findings of negative share price
performance prior to the repurchase announcement and positive and significant
announcement day abnormal returns. The results of our probit models are consistent
with the free cash flow hypothesis and provide at least partial support for the rent
extraction, signalling and capital structure hypothesis. In addition, the results of the
cross-sectional regressions provide strong support for the signalling hypothesis once we
control for selection bias. We find only weak support for the free cash flow and rent
extraction hypothesis.
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Chapter 3
Dividends, Stock Repurchases,
and the Lintner Model:
A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis of German Firms
3.1 Introduction
The question of how firms decide on the amount of cash to be disbursed to shareholders
has attracted the attention of financial economists for decades. Lintner’s (1956) partial
adjustment model still is the workhorse of empirical investigations of corporate payout
decisions.1 He developed his model in a period when dividends were the dominant form
of payouts. More recently, however, the volume of stock repurchases has caught up, and
there have been years in which the volume of stock repurchases by listed U.S. firms
has surpassed the volume of dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Skinner (2008,
p. 608) concludes that his empirical evidence ”suggests that repurchases have become
the dominant form of payout”.
In spite of this, however, in most empirical applications Lintner’s (1956) partial
adjustment models of payout policy is applied to dividend payouts rather than to
total payouts. There are only very few exceptions in the literature. Grullon and
Michaely (2002) estimate a traditional dividend-based Lintner model and then relate
the resulting dividend errors (the difference between actual and predicted dividends) to
the repurchase volume. The only paper we are aware of that estimates a Lintner model
based on total payouts is Skinner (2008). He uses two restricted samples, one consisting
1For recent applications see, among others, Andres et al. (2009), Chemmanur et al. (2010), and Skinner
(2008). For a recent theoretical paper that builds on Lintner’s model see Lambrecht and Myers (2012).
There are also critical voices, though. De Angelo et al. (2008) argue that the model has lost some of
its descriptive ability, mostly because the number of firms that have a well-defined target payout ratio
has decreased.
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of firms that repurchase and pay dividends in most years, and one consisting of firms
that repurchase and never pay dividends. So far no paper estimates a Lintner model
on full payouts for a comprehensive sample that permits to draw general conclusions
on the choice between dividends and repurchases.
The correct specification depends on the economic reasons that drive the choice
between dividends and stock repurchases. When both are good substitutes for each
other (as argued by Miller and Modigliani (1961), and as would be the case in a
world of perfect capital markets) the model should be better at explaining total
payouts rather than dividends. Tax-based explanations predict that firms choose the
payout method that receives the more favorable tax treatment. In this case the correct
model specification may depend on the tax regime. The financial flexibility hypothesis
brought forward by Jagannathan et al. (2000) states that dividends are used to pay out
permanent earnings while stock repurchases are used to pay out transitory earnings. In
this case the estimation of a Lintner-type model requires the decomposition of earnings
into a permanent and a transitory component.
In this paper we put the cart before the horse. We estimate different versions of
Lintner-type partial adjustment models. The results then allow us to draw inferences
on the motives underlying the choice between dividends and stock repurchases. Our
sample is a large panel of German firms covering the period 1988-2008. This sample
has two distinct advantages. First, stock repurchases were essentially prohibited until
1998. Therefore, we can analyze how the introduction of an alternative to dividends
affects corporate payout decisions. Second, a major change in the tax system in 2001
affected the relative attractiveness of dividends and stock repurchases. This allows us
to investigate the importance of tax considerations for corporate payout decisions in
general, and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases in particular.
Our results can be summarized as follows. The introduction of repurchases in
1998 has materially affected the payout policy of German firms. This is inconsistent
with the substitutes hypothesis. We find no evidence that German firms have altered
their payout policy in response to the 2001 tax reform. Our results provide support
for the flexibility hypothesis. Our results imply that dividends are more sticky than
total payouts. This is consistent with the prediction of the flexibility hypothesis that
dividends are predominantly paid out of permanent earnings. We further document
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that, after the introduction of repurchases, the responsiveness of dividends to changes
in transitory earnings is reduced substantially. This corroborates the evidence in favor
of the flexibility hypothesis.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first
paper that uses a partial adjustment model to analyze how the introduction of stock
repurchases affects the magnitude and determinants of dividend payouts. Second, we
test whether a Lintner-type partial adjustment model is better suited to model dividend
payouts or total payouts. Different from Skinner (2008), we do not restrict our sample
to firms with a particular history of payout decisions. Third, we decompose earnings
into a permanent and a temporary component. We then integrate both components
in a partial adjustment model in order to test the hypothesis (brought forward by
Jagannathan et al., 2000) that dividends are used to disburse permanent earnings while
stock repurchases are used to pay out temporary earnings. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper that tests the flexibility hypothesis within a Lintner-type partial
adjustment model. In our empirical analysis we use GMM-in-systems estimations, and
we explicitly consider the role of special dividends (which, prior to the introduction of
stock repurchases, might have been used to disburse temporary earnings).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
institutional setting in Germany. Section 3.3 develops our hypotheses. Section 3.4
presents the sample and descriptive statistics. In section 3.5 we describe the econometric
methodology and the results, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Institutional Setting
As pointed out above, the development of the institutional framework in Germany
provides an ideal environment for our research questions. During the first half of our
sample period (1988-1997) stock repurchases were effectively prohibited. In 1998 a new
law came into force which allowed stock repurchases. Besides this change in regulation
there was also a major change in the taxation system. Until 2001 Germany operated a
full imputation system that favored dividend payouts over repurchases for most investor
types. After the 2001 tax reform the tax preference of most investors shifted towards
repurchases.
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In the following, we describe several aspects of the institutional environment of
German firms as well as relevant changes over the sample period. These issues are
dividends (section 3.2.1), stock repurchases (3.2.2) and the tax treatment of dividends
and stock repurchases (3.2.3).
3.2.1 Dividends
German firms pay annual (rather than quarterly) dividends. The payout decisions of
German Stock Corporations (Aktiengesellschaften) are governed by §58 of the Stock
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG).2 The executive and the supervisory board can
decide to retain up to 50% of the profits. The decision on whether to retain or to pay
out the remaining amount is taken by the shareholders’ meeting by simple majority
vote. In practice it is almost always the case that the shareholders’ meeting votes in
favor of the proposal made by the executive board. The payment date is usually the
business day following the day of the annual shareholders’ meeting.3
Firms may pay special designated dividends (Sonderdividenden). They are of
particular interest for our study because special designated dividends may be close
substitutes for stock repurchases (De Angelo et al., 2000).4 This, in turn, is of particular
importance because repurchases were essentially prohibited until 1998.
2The following description relates to the standard case. The articles of incorporation may allow for
deviations from this standard procedure. In addition, §150 AktG prescribes that a firm has to retain
at least 5% of its earnings as long as the total amount of retained earnings amounts to less than 10%
of the dedicated capital (Grundkapital).
3Some firms have issued both common shares and non-voting preferred shares. The preferred
shareholders are entitled to a cumulative minimum dividend (§139 AktG). These claims have priority
over dividend payments to common shareholders. If the minimum preferred dividend is not paid in a
given year, it is cumulated and has to be paid out in later years. If the dividend is not paid for two
consecutive years, owners of preferred shares are entitled to a temporary voting right (§140 AktG),
until the cumulated minimum dividend has been paid. In addition, non-voting shares are often entitled
to an excess dividend, i.e. a dividend that is larger by a specified amount than the dividend paid to
common shareholders.
4This view is supported by empirical results in Brickley (1983). For a sample of U.S. firms he finds
higher dividend payouts in the year following a dividend increase than in the year following a special
designated dividend. This indicates that special designated dividends are weaker signals of higher
future payouts than increases of regular dividends.
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3.2.2 Stock Repurchases
Until 1998, stock repurchases were essentially prohibited in Germany.5 In 1998, a new
law came into force that allowed stock repurchases. Under this law firms are allowed
to buy back up to 10% of their shares.6 A firm wishing to buy back shares has to
follow a standardized procedure. As a first step the shareholders’ meeting (with simple
majority) has to grant the managerial board the permission to buy back shares. This
permission has to specify the maximum number of shares to be bought back (not more
than 10% of shares outstanding), the minimum and maximum price to be paid per
share, and the time of validity of the permission (initially not longer than 18 months;
increased to 5 years in 2008).
This permission gives the managerial board the right, but not the obligation, to
buy back shares.7 Once the board decides to actually initiate a repurchase program
the firm has to communicate this fact to the public. This is mandated by the
German securities trading act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) which requires that listed
firms immediately disclose information that is likely to materially affect security prices
(”ad-hoc disclosure”). Empirical studies analyzing the impact of stock repurchase
announcements on share prices typically use the date of the ad-hoc disclosure as the
event date (e.g. Gerke et al., 2002; Schremper, 2003; Seifert and Stehle, 2003; Hackethal
and Zdantchouk, 2006; Bessler et al., 2012).
Firms are required to treat all shareholders equally. This precludes negotiated
repurchases from large shareholders. Open market repurchases, repurchase tender offers
and transferrable put rights are admissible, though. Open market repurchases are the
dominating form.
As is the case in the U.S., the announcement of a stock repurchase still does
not require the managerial board to actually repurchase shares. The actual amount of
5Firms could acquire their own shares only under restrictive conditions (e.g. to prevent damage).
Although there is some disagreement in the literature as to the actual number of repurchases in
Germany prior to 1998 (see Seifert, 2006, for a discussion) it is safe to conclude that stock repurchases
were not used as a means of disbursing cash to shareholders prior to 1998.
6The 10% threshold applies to an individual repurchase program, not to the total amount of repurchases
during the life of the firm.
7Given permission through the annual meeting, the decision to initiate a repurchase program is taken
by the executive board and approved by the supervisory board.
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repurchases is published in the firm’s financial statement. This information thus allows
us to identify the repurchase volume in a fiscal year.
Since 2004 new regulation adopted by the European Union imposes additional
restrictions on stock repurchases. Individual transactions made as part of a repurchase
program now have to be reported within seven trading days. Further, there are
restrictions on the prices at which open market repurchases can be made (not higher
than the price of the previous transaction) and on the maximum daily repurchase
volume (not more than 25% of the average daily volume on the market on which the
trade is made).
Finally, there are two ways in which the firm can handle the repurchased shares.
First, it can treat them as an asset on the asset side of the balance sheet. They can
then be used to cover outstanding convertible bonds or executive stock options. The
maximum number of shares a firm can hold on its balance sheet is 10% of the shares
outstanding. Alternatively, the firm can reduce the number of shares outstanding. In
this case the firm’s book equity is reduced by the repurchase volume.
3.2.3 Taxation of Dividends and Repurchases
The tax treatment of dividends and repurchases underwent a major change in 2001.
Until 2001 Germany operated a full imputation system. Dividends paid to domestic
investors were essentially taxed at the investor’s personal tax rate.8 Retained earnings
were taxed at a corporate tax rate. Capital gains were tax exempt when the shares
were held for more than six months (twelve months from 1999 onwards). Consequently,
investors with a personal tax rate below the corporate rate on retained earnings favored
dividends over repurchases while investors with a tax rate above the corporate rate
favored repurchases. The latter group was usually small as the corporate tax rate on
retained earnings was very close to the highest marginal tax rate on personal income.
Corporate shareholders had a preference for dividends, as they received dividends tax
free while capital gains were taxed at the corporate tax rate. Foreign investors did not
8Dividends were first taxed at the firm level. Domestic investors received the gross dividend plus a tax
credit equal to the tax paid by the firm. The gross dividend was taxed at the investor’s personal tax
rate. The resulting tax liability was then offset against the tax credit.
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receive the tax credit and may therefore have had a preference for repurchases.
Since 2001 dividends and retained earnings are taxed at the same rate at the
corporate level. At the personal investor level, half of the net dividend is taxed at the
investor’s personal tax rate. Capital gains are not taxed when the shares are held for
more than one year. When this condition is met individual investors should thus have
a clear preference for repurchases over dividends. For corporate investors, dividend
payments were essentially tax-free.9 At the same time, capital gains from the sale of
shares held in another company were also tax-exempt. Corporate investors were thus
largely indifferent between dividend and repurchases.
In summary, while the preference for dividends versus repurchases depended on
the status (domestic versus foreign) and the personal tax rate of the investor prior to
2001, there should be a clear preference for repurchases after 2001. We thus expect a
shift from dividends to repurchases after the 2001 tax reform.
3.3 Hypotheses
Lintner’s (1956) model is based on the presumption that firms have a target payout
ratio. Therefore, changes in earnings translate into payout changes. The adjustment is
not immediate, though. Rather, firms adjust their payout only partially towards the
new target level. In its simplest form the model thus yields the adjustment process
∆Di,t = αi + ci(D
∗
i,t −Di,t−1) + ui,t (3.1)
D∗i,t = riPi,t (3.2)
where Di,t denotes the dividend of firm i in period t, Pi,t denotes profits, D
∗
i,t are
the desired dividend payments, ri is the target payout ratio for firm i and ci is the
speed-of-adjustment coefficient.
The model was developed at a time when stock repurchases were very rare.
Therefore, it only considered dividend payouts. Despite the growing importance of
9Since 2004 5% of the received dividend had to be declared as revenue and was therefore subject to
the corporate tax rate.
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repurchases most researchers have continued to use Lintner’s framework to model
dividend payouts only. Two notable exceptions are Grullon and Michaely (2002) and
Skinner (2008). Whether it is appropriate to model total payouts rather than dividend
payouts is an open question, though. It hinges on the motives why firms choose
dividends or repurchases.
In a world without differential tax treatment of dividends and repurchases or
other frictions, the two payout methods would be perfect substitutes.10 Grullon and
Michaely (2002) report empirical evidence that US firms increasingly use repurchases
as substitutes for dividends. If indeed dividends and repurchases were close substitutes
for each other it would be appropriate to apply the Lintner model to total payouts
rather than to dividends only.
An implication of perfect substitutability would be that a firm’s payout decision
does not depend on the available menu of payout methods. Consequently, under perfect
substitutability the introduction of repurchases should not affect the payout policy. This
leads to our first hypothesis.
H3.1 (substitutes): The introduction of repurchases in 1998 does not affect the
parameters of a Lintner model of total payout.
When the tax system treats dividends and repurchases differently, firms have an obvious
reason to prefer one payout method over the other. As explained in section 3.2, the
German tax reform in 2001 has made repurchases more attractive. We thus have
H3.2 (taxes): The 2001 tax reform results in a reduction of the (target) dividend payout
ratio and a corresponding increase in the amount of repurchases.
So far we have assumed that (absent differential tax treatment) dividends and
repurchases are good substitutes. This need not be the case, though. The earnings of
a firm may consist of a permanent component and a transitory component. Managers
10The assumption of a frictionless world is not a necessary condition for the substitute hypothesis to
hold. The principal-agent models of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) imply that managers pay
dividends in order to disburse free cash flow and thus to reduce agency costs. A similar argument can
be made in favor of repurchases. In signaling models of payout decisions (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller
and Rock, 1985) managers use dividends to signal information about future profitability. In a similar
way, repurchases could be used as signals. Thus, both the principal-agent models and the signaling
models are consistent with the substitute hypothesis.
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may be reluctant to increase dividends in response to high transitory earnings because
the higher dividend level may not be sustainable, and managers typically try to avoid
dividend cuts.11 Against this background, Jagannathan et al. (2000) have argued that
firms use dividends to disburse permanent earnings but use repurchases to pay out
transitory earnings. This is referred to as the flexibility hypothesis. The survey results
reported in Brav et al. (2005) as well as the empirical evidence in Guay and Harford
(2000) support the flexibility hypothesis.
H3.3 (flexibility / payout): Changes in dividend payouts are caused by changes in
permanent earnings but unrelated to changes in transitory earnings.
The flexibility hypothesis implies that repurchases track the more volatile transitory
component of earnings. Consequently, we should expect that repurchases are adjusted
quickly to changes in (transitory) earning. This implies the following hypothesis.
H3.4 (flexibility / speed of adjustment): The speed of adjustment coefficient will be
larger in a Lintner model of total payout than in a Lintner model of dividends.
As noted in section 3.2, firms can use special designated dividends to disburse transitory
cash flows. The flexibility hypothesis implies that firms used special dividends for
that purpose prior to 1998 when repurchases were essentially prohibited. With the
introduction of repurchases the importance of special dividends should decline. This
should hold in particular after the 2001 tax reform which puts dividends at a
disadvantage relative to repurchases.
H3.5 (special dividends): Special designated dividends lose importance after 1998.
We note that De Angelo et al. (2000) reject the hypothesis that special dividends
were displaced by repurchases. We believe, though, that the German setting, where
repurchases were prohibited prior to 1998 warrants a reconsideration of this hypothesis.
Young firms tend to have volatile earnings and may therefore be reluctant to
initiate dividend payments (Fama and French, 2001). They may, however, be willing
11Michaely et al. (1995) show that the negative market reaction after dividend cuts is stronger than the
positive market reaction after dividend increases.
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to repurchase shares.12 We therefore expect that the fraction of firms that do not
distribute cash to shareholders (using either dividends or repurchases) decreases after
1998.
H3.6 (fraction of non-payers): The fraction of firms that do not pay out cash to
shareholders decreases after 1998.
3.4 Sample and Data Description
In this section, we describe the construction of our sample and present summary
statistics. The descriptive analysis will already provide a first indication of the validity
of some of our hypotheses.
3.4.1 Sample Selection
Our sample covers all non-financial firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange that
were among the largest 200 non-financial firms in Germany (as measured by total
assets13) at any time during the 21-year period 1988-2008. This results in an initial
sample of 424 firms. Our sample on average covers 67.2% of the aggregate market
capitalization of all listed firms in Germany.
We drop firms-years in which a control agreement was in place.14 The reason
is that firms that are subject to a control agreement do not decide independently on
their payout. We further restrict our sample to firms with at least two consecutive firm-
year observations. The resulting data set is an unbalanced panel with 4,363 firm-year
observations.
Until 1998 domestic firms had to prepare their accounts according to German
accounting standards. Between 1998 and 2004 they were allowed (but not required)
to apply international accounting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) instead. Since
12Typically, special dividends are declared in addition to regular dividends. Therefore, special designated
dividends are not an alternative for these firms.
13We measure total assets at year-end. If the fiscal year of a firm is not the calendar year, we estimate
the year-end value of total assets as a time-weighted average of the total assets in the previous and
following fiscal year.
14A control agreement implies that the firm is effectively controlled by a parent company. For a more
detailed discussion see Andres et al. (2009).
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2005 application of IAS/IFRS is mandatory. A change in the accounting standards can
affect reported earnings significantly. We therefore use dummy variables to control for
the accounting standards that were applied. In a robustness check, we exclude the first
firm-year after a change in accounting standards.15 The results are similar and are thus
omitted.
Information on balance sheet items, items from the income statement and
dividends were collected from Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienfuehrer. This is a yearly
publication that provides detailed information (e.g., ownership structure, board
composition, financial report information) on German listed firms. Values denominated
in Deutsche Mark were converted to Euros at the official conversion rate.16
The dividend information we collect contains the nominal value and the tax credit
(under the imputation system in effect until 2001) as well as any special designated
dividend. We further obtain information on the number of shares outstanding. If a firm
has several classes of shares (typically common shares and non-voting preferred shares)
we calculate the total dividend payout. All values are adjusted for stock splits, stock
dividends and changes in the dedicated capital (e.g. due to seasoned equity issues).
We further collect data on stock repurchases for the period 1998-2008. As outlined
in section 3.2, the initiation of a repurchase has to be publicly announced. Subsequently,
the actual amount of repurchases has to be published in the annual report. We use this
information to infer the amount of repurchases in each fiscal year.
German firms typically pay the annual dividend in the second quarter of the
fiscal year. These dividends, however, are paid out of earnings of the previous year.
Therefore, we link each dividend payment to the fiscal year preceding the year in
which the dividend was paid. Thus, as an example, we link the dividend paid in 2004
to earnings in 2003.
Matters are more complicated for repurchases. For example, repurchases occurring
early in 2004 are likely to be related to 2003 earnings, while repurchases later in
the year may well be made in response to interim earnings figures for 2004. In our
baseline specification we treat repurchases like dividends, i.e., repurchases made in 2004
15In the first year after a change in accounting standards, first-differenced earnings figures are calculated
from two financial reports prepared according to different rules.
16The official conversion rate of 1998 is 1.95583 Deutsche Mark per Euro
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are linked to earnings for 2003. As a robustness check, we implement an alternative
specification. We link repurchases to the earnings of the year in which the repurchase
occurs (i.e., repurchases made in 2004 are linked to 2004 earnings).17
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for per-share earnings, total payouts and regular
dividends. Total payout is the sum of regular dividends (including the tax credit until
2001), special dividends (also including the tax credit when applicable) and repurchases
(from 1998 onwards).
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for dividends, total payout and earnings in Euros per
share. Total payout is defined as the sum of regular (gross) dividends, special dividends,
and stock repurchases. The sample consists of 4,363 firm-year observations over the sample
period from 1988 to 2008. Since we do not have information on special dividends for 21
firm-year observations, the number of observation for total payout is reduced accordingly.
Earnings Total Payout Dividends
Mean 15.35 10.13 7.95
Standard Deviation 83.34 43.08 21.98
Coefficient of Variation 5.43 4.86 2.77
Median 5.03 3.99 3.91
Maximum 2,278.00 1,566.00 399.42
Minimum -1.078.43 0.00 0.00
No. Observations 4,363 4,342 4,363
On average, firms pay out about two thirds of their earnings. Regular dividends
on average account for 51.8% of earnings. Total payouts are almost as volatile as
earnings (coefficient of variation 4.86 as compared to 5.43). Regular dividends, on
the other hand, are much less volatile. Their coefficient of variation is 2.77, about half
the corresponding value for earnings. These results are consistent with the stylized fact
that ”regular dividends are what is smoothed, and not total payouts” (de Angelo et al.
2008, p. 158). The finding that total payouts are much more volatile than dividends is
inconsistent with the substitutes hypothesis. If dividends and repurchases were indeed
close substitutes there would be no reason to smooth dividends but not total payouts.
17The results are similar and are not reported.
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Figure 3.1: Composition of Total Payout
Figure 3.1 depicts the composition of total payout over the sample period from
1988-2008. All ratios are based on gross payouts relative to earnings.
Table 3.2 shows the evolution of dividend payout ratios, special dividend payout
ratios, repurchase ratios, and total payout ratios over time. The payout ratios are also
displayed in Figure 3.1. Dividend ratios appear to decrease over time. In particular, the
average ratio for the pre-repurchase period 1988-1997 is 56.4% while the corresponding
value for the repurchase period 1998-2008 is only 44.2%. It is also noteworthy that
(contrary to hypothesis H3.2) dividend payout ratios do not decrease after the 2001
tax reform.
The total payout ratio, on the other hand, changed only slightly, from 57.7% to
53.7%. These shifts are consistent with dividends being substituted by repurchases.
Interestingly, though, the special dividend ratio does not decrease but rather increases,
from 1.3% to 1.5%. This is consistent with De Angelo et al. (2000) but clearly
inconsistent with our hypothesis H3.5.
Stock repurchases are much less important in Germany than they are in the
U.S. The highest repurchase ratio is 17.2%, observed in 2000. Repurchase ratios are
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Table 3.2: Aggregate Payout Ratios
Table 3.2 provides annual information on payout ratios. The data consist of all firm-year
observations with positive earnings (therefore, the number of observations is lower than
in Table 1). Yearly payout ratios are obtained by relating aggregate payouts (dividends
and/or repurchases) to aggregate earnings
∑
iEARN .
∑
iDIV is the aggregate dividend
payout per year expressed in millions of Euros. Accordingly,
∑
i SPECIAL is defined as
the aggregate payout of special dividends,
∑
iREP is the aggregate repurchase volume,
and
∑
i TP is the sum of the three aforementioned items. We dropped two special
dividends from the sample. Heidelberg Druckmaschinen AG paid a special dividend of
e 27.71 in 1997. Altana AG paid a special dividend of e 33.50 in 2007. This corresponds
to a special payout volume of 2,833 Mio. eand 4,732 Mio. e, corresponding to 77.54% and
61.98% of the pre-dividend market value of equity, respectively. We additionally report
average payout ratios for the overall sample period (1988-2008), the period before the
introduction of stock repurchases (1998-1997), and the period thereafter (1998-2008).
Year # OBS
∑
iDIV∑
i EARN
∑
i SPECIAL∑
i EARN
∑
iREP∑
i EARN
∑
i TP∑
i EARN
1988 147 70.34% 1.73% - 72.07%
1989 158 65.42% 0.36% - 65.78%
1990 164 51.16% 1.15% - 52.31%
1991 170 68.97% 1.11% - 70.08%
1992 136 35.08% 0.12% - 35.20%
1993 149 73.89% 0.87% - 74.76%
1994 151 70.89% 3.66% - 74.55%
1995 170 61.22% 1.57% - 62.79%
1996 164 55.33% 0.51% - 55.84%
1997 155 55.48% 3.16% - 58.64%
1998 181 62.44% 0.50% 0.02% 62.96%
1999 193 58.91% 1.04% 2.51% 62.46%
2000 227 39.95% 0.63% 17.15% 57.73%
2001 224 39.09% 4.24% 9.05% 52.39%
2002 179 39.90% 1.69% 1.64% 43.24%
2003 169 45.04% 1.98% 2.43% 49.44%
2004 157 47.47% 0.26% 6.81% 54.53%
2005 182 46.21% 0.55% 4.62% 51.38%
2006 184 49.27% 0.41% 5.06% 54.74%
2007 192 43.06% 1.15% 6.71% 50.92%
2008 179 36.90% 2.33% 16.56% 55.79%
1988-97 1,417 56.43% 1.31% - 57.74%
1998-08 2,067 44.24% 1.53% 7.90% 53.67%
1988-08 3,484 4 7.12% 1.49% 6.16% 54.77%
much lower than dividend ratios in each single year. The low repurchase ratios might
be explained by the fact that repurchases were prohibited before 1998 and firms only
slowly adopted this additional method of payout. Note, though, that the fact that
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the largest repurchase ratio in our sample is observed already in 2000 casts doubt
on that explanation. An alternative explanation of the low repurchase ratios rests on
the restrictive regulation which requires advance approval by the shareholders meeting
and limits each individual repurchase program to no more than 10% of the shares
outstanding.
Table 3.3 shows the fraction of firms that increased, decreased, or held constant
their dividend and total payout, respectively. As the figures for dividends and total
payouts are almost identical we concentrate on the former. Dividends are unchanged
in more than 35% of the cases. We observe much more increases (about 40%) than
decreases and omissions (together 28.3%). This pattern is consistent with managers
being reluctant to cut dividends (and total payouts). A similar asymmetry between
increases and decreases has also been reported for the U.S. (e.g. Jagannathan et al.,
2000; Skinner, 2008) and for Germany (Andres et al., 2009).
As argued above, we expect the fraction of firms that do not distribute earnings
to shareholders to decrease after the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We
therefore divide our sample firms into two groups, those that pay dividends in a
particular year and those that do not. The latter group is further decomposed into two
subgroups, firms that pay no dividend in a particular year but have paid a dividend
in earlier years, and firms that never paid a dividend. The fraction of sample firms in
these four groups is depicted in Figure 3.2.
The fraction of dividend-paying firms decreased steadily until about 2003 and
then started to rebound. It is noteworthy that the fraction of dividend-paying firms
did not decrease in 1998 when repurchases were introduced; if anything, it increased.
The fraction of non-paying firms is the complement of the fraction of paying firms and
is thus not interesting in itself. What is interesting, though, is the decomposition into
former payers and firms that never paid out dividends to shareholders. The fraction of
the latter group has been close to zero until 1997. It started to increase in 1998 and
then reached a plateau in 2001 where it stayed for several years. Since 2005 we observe
a slight decline.
The increase in the fraction of firms that never paid out dividends coincides
with the introduction of repurchases in 1998 and with the hot IPO market at the end
of the 1990s. Thus, the newly listed firms either use repurchases to disburse cash to
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Table 3.3: Type of Payout Change
Table 3.3 shows the type and number of payout changes for each year of our sample. A
firm can increase, decrease or maintain its payout relative to the previous year. In case of
a decrease, a firm can either reduce or omit payouts. Total payout is defined as the sum
of regular (gross) dividends, special dividends, and stock repurchases.
Dividends Total Payout
Year Increase Maintain Decrease Omit Increase Maintain Decrease Omit
1988 45 77 24 4 38 65 22 4
1989 65 72 19 3 67 70 19 3
1990 76 65 19 3 76 65 19 3
1991 72 58 40 10 76 58 36 10
1992 53 53 48 19 53 52 49 19
1993 40 71 39 11 42 70 38 11
1994 67 32 83 15 67 31 84 15
1995 87 63 35 5 83 62 40 5
1996 80 58 47 19 74 58 53 19
1997 72 61 52 16 73 60 52 14
1998 97 62 28 6 94 63 30 6
1999 82 82 39 6 81 79 43 6
2000 86 54 66 8 92 50 64 7
2001 130 48 61 8 124 47 68 7
2002 67 58 108 25 66 56 111 25
2003 61 113 55 23 62 108 59 23
2004 115 70 36 17 109 66 46 19
2005 86 73 58 8 90 67 60 9
2006 107 97 16 6 102 92 26 8
2007 100 98 23 11 106 82 33 10
2008 108 91 19 11 115 73 30 12
1988- 657 610 406 105 649 591 412 103
97 (39.3%) (36.5%) (24.3%) (6.3%) (39.3%) (35.8%) (24.9%) (6.2%)
1998- 1039 846 509 129 1041 783 570 132
08 (43.4%) (35.3%) (21.3%) (5.4%) (43.5%) (32.7%) (23.8%) (5.5%)
1988- 1696 1456 915 234 1690 1374 982 235
08 (41.7%) (35.8%) (22.5%) (5.8%) (41.8%) (34.0%) (24.3%) (5.8%)
their shareholders, or they do not disburse cash at all. We find that the latter is the
dominant case. Most of the firms that never paid dividends (287 firm-year observations
in the 1998-2008 period) do not repurchase shares either. Our data set only contains 35
firm-year observations (12.2%) in which a firm that never paid a dividend repurchases
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shares.
Figure 3.2: Percent of Sample Firms in Different Dividend Groups
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the different dividend groups. A firm-year
observation is defined as ’payer ’ if a firm pays a regular dividend in the relevant
year. Otherwise, the observation is defined as ’non-payer ’. For each non-payer we
additionally track the whole history of dividend payments. If a company has never
paid a regular dividend since its IPO, we define this firm-year observations ’never
paid ’ A ’former payer ’ is defined as a firm that is currently not paying a regular
dividend, but did so in at least one firm-year after going public.
3.5 Methodology and Results
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous section already give some indication
about the validity of our hypotheses. To draw further conclusions, we run a set of
multivariate regressions that are derived from Lintner’s (1956) model of dividend
payouts. In the following, we explain in detail how the original model is adapted to
test changes in the payout policy of our sample firms.
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3.5.1 Model specifications
The starting point of our analysis is the Lintner (1956) model in its simplest form18
∆Di,t = αi + ci(D
∗
i,t −Di,t−1) + ui,t (3.3)
D∗i,t = riPi,t (3.4)
where αi is a constant, ci is the speed of adjustment coefficient, Pi,t are after-tax
earnings, Di,t are dividend payments, ∆Di,t is the change in dividend payments, D
∗
i,t
are the desired dividend payments and ri is the target payout ratio for firm i. Equation
(3.3) models partial adjustment towards the desired level of dividends D∗i,t, provided
that 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1. The two polar cases correspond to complete adjustment (ci = 1) and
no adjustment (ci = 0) towards the desired payout level.
Substitution of (3.4) into (3.3) yields
∆Di,t = αi + biPi,t + diDi,t−1 + ui,t (3.5)
where bi = ciri and di = (1 − ci) . It is common to assume that the target payout
ratio and the speed of adjustment coefficient are constant across firms (Andres et al.,
2009; Fama, 1974; Skinner, 2008). Adding year-fixed effects (Y EARt)
19 and firm-fixed
effects (ηi, to capture firm-specific heterogeneity) yields the baseline specification
Di,t = bPi,t + dDi,t−1 + Y EARt + ηi + υi,t (3.6)
This specification considers (regular) dividends only. Denoting special dividends by Si,t
and repurchases by Ri,t we obtain a model based on total payouts
(Di,t + Si,t +Ri,t) = bPi,t + d(Di,t−1 + Si,t−1 +Ri,t−1) + Y EARt + ηi + υi,t (3.7)
18We also estimate a model in which we additionally include lagged earnings as suggested by Fama and
Babiak (1968). The results are similar and are not reported.
19We re-estimated all models without the year-fixed effects. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Under the substitute hypothesis model (3.7) is a reasonable specification.
Hypothesis H3.1 states that the introduction of repurchases in 1998 does not
affect the parameters of a Lintner model of total payouts. To test this hypothesis we
define a dummy variable which is set to 0 before 1998 and set to 1 from 1998 onwards.
This dummy variable is interacted with the independent variables of the total payout
model (3.7). The coefficient estimates allow us to test whether the target total payout
ratio and/or the speed of adjustment changed after the introduction of repurchases in
1998.
Hypothesis H3.2 states that the 2001 tax reform should result in a reduction of
dividend payout ratios. To test this hypothesis we augment our baseline model (the
dividends-only model (3.6)) with a dummy variable which is set to 0 before the tax
reform and set to 1 thereafter. The dummy variable is interacted with the independent
variables. The coefficient estimates allow us to test whether the target dividend payout
ratio and/or the speed of adjustment changed after the tax reform.
The flexibility hypothesis (our hypothesis H3.3) states that dividends are paid
out of permanent earnings while repurchases (and special dividends) are paid out of
transitory earnings. Model (3.7) is then an inappropriate specification because it does
not differentiate between the two components of earnings.
Testing the flexibility hypothesis requires decomposing earnings into a permanent
and a transitory component. We use the following simple procedure. We define
permanent earnings PermPi,t to be the three-year moving average of earnings.
20
Transitory earnings TransPi,t is defined to be the deviation between total and
permanent earnings.
As a robustness check we implement two alternative specifications. First, we use a
five-year moving average instead of a three-year moving average. Second, we estimate an
AR(1)-model for each firm. The predicted values are then interpreted as the permanent
component of earnings while the residual is interpreted as the transitory component.
The results for these alternative specifications are similar to those shown in Table 3.7
20Our choice of three-year moving averages is inspired by the definition of cash flow shocks in Guay
and Harford (2000). They consider shocks in cash-flows as the average of cash-flows in years t = 0
and t = −1 and measure the permanence in cash flow shocks as the difference between a three-year
post-shock cash-flows period (t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3) and a three-year pre-shock cash-flows period
(t = −4, t = −3 and t = −2).
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and are therefore omitted.
We estimate the following model
Di,t = bPermPi,t + kTransPi,t + dDi,t−1 + Y EARt + ηi + υi (3.8)
If dividend changes reflect changes in permanent earnings the coefficient k in equation
(3.8) should, according to hypothesis H3.3, be zero. Moreover, firms could not use
repurchases to disburse temporary earnings prior to 1998. Consequently, there may
be a structural break in 1998. We address this issue by including a shift variable
that measures differences between the period prior to 1998 and the period from 1998
onwards.
Under the flexibility hypothesis positive transitory earnings are expected to result
in repurchases or special dividends. To test this hypothesis we define the variable
TranP+i,t which equals the transitory earnings as defined above when they are positive,
and which equals zero when the transitory earnings are negative. We then estimate the
following model based on repurchases and special dividends
Si,t +Ri,t = bPermPi,t + kTransP
+
i,t + d(Si,t +Ri,t) + Y EARt + ηi + υi (3.9)
We expect k to be positive and b to be zero.
3.5.2 Estimation methods
The models we estimate are dynamic panel data models with a relatively short time
dimension (T=21) and a relatively large number of firms (N=424).21 It is well known
that in this case the OLS estimator yields upward-biased estimates of the coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable. The within-group estimator (WG) (which is obtained
by subtracting the firm-specific mean from all observations), on the other hand, yields
downward-biased estimates (e.g. Bond, 2002; Nickel, 1981). Consistent estimates can
21T = 21 is the maximum number of firm-years for an individual firm. As our dataset is an unbalanced
panel, the average number of firm-years is much smaller and amounts to 11 years. Similarly, the
average number of firm observations per year amounts to 208 and is thus smaller than the number of
different firms in our sample
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be obtained by GMM. We therefore implement the GMM-in-systems (GMM-SYS)
estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). It simultaneously estimates the equation in first
differences with lagged levels as instruments and the equation in levels with lagged first
differences as instruments.
When implementing the GMM-SYS estimator we apply Roodman’s (2009) rule
of thumb. It states that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of
cross-sectional units (firms in our case). We impose this restriction and then choose
the instrument matrix with the highest p-value for the Hansen-test of overidentifying
restrictions.
Besides the GMM estimator we also report the OLS and WG estimators. The
coefficient on lagged payout obtained when using the GMM-SYS estimator should lie
in between the estimators obtained from the OLS and the WG estimators.
3.5.3 Results
For all model specifications, we report estimates based on OLS, alongside with within-
group (WG) and GMM-in-systems (GMM(SYS)) estimators. We start the analysis
by estimating original specification as a benchmark model. Columns (1) to (3) of
Table 3.4 contain the coefficient estimates of the baseline model specification (3.6).
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable vary between 0.67 (WG) and 0.80
(OLS), with a GMM(SYS) coefficient estimate (0.68) that is much closer to the within-
groups estimator. These results confirm the prediction of an upward bias in OLS. The
parameter estimates result in a speed of adjustment in the range of [0.20, 0.34], which
is roughly in line with other studies on German data (Andres et al., 2009; Behm and
Zimmermann, 1993). The estimated target payout ratio (b/(1−d)) varies between 0.23
(WG) and 0.48 (GMM(SYS)). Accordingly, estimates obtained via OLS and GMM
(SYS) are very close to the average dividend payout ratio over the full sample period
(46.6%, as documented in Table 3.2).
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Table 3.4: Classical Lintner model & Total payout model
Table 3.4 shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-Systems (GMM-SYS)
regressions with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition
we report the results with total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The
number of observations is slightly lower for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable
to identify whether a special dividend was paid in addition to the regular dividend. The first
column shows the independent variables. Di,t−1 and Si,t−1 are dividends and special dividends
per share paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t−1 corresponds to the repurchase volume
per share in the previous year.P represents after-tax earnings per share. For the within-group
models the coefficient for Constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata
12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The statistics m1 and
m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic
is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of
valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. All regressions include year
dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The Speed of Adjustment
is calculated as one minus the coefficient for Di,t−1 (or Di,t−1 +Si,t−1 +Ri,t−1, respectively). The
Target Ratio equals the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the Speed of Adjustment.
Regular dividends Total payout
OLS WG GMM OLS WG GMM
(SYS) (SYS)
Constant 1.111 1.675 −0.168∗ 2.937∗∗∗ 1.955 7.404
Di,t−1 0.802∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ − − −
(6.89) (6.16) (5.95)
Di,t−1 + Si,t−1 + Ri,t−1 − − − 0.252 0.139 0.183
Pi,t 0.083
∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
(2.14) (2.11) (2.79) (2.68) (2.40) (4.10)
m1 − − −2.59 − − −1.98
m2 − − −1.08 − − −1.30
Hansen (d.f) − − 334.22 − − 339.90
(316) (313)
Observations 3960 3960 3960 3909 3909 3909
Target Ratio 0.419 0.234 0.483 0.453 0.372 0.525
Speed of Adj. 0.198 0.334 0.319 0.748 0.861 0.817
Not surprisingly, the estimates of the target payout ratio are higher for the full
payout model (columns (4)-(6)). These estimates are based on model specification (3.7),
where (regular) dividends, special dividends and repurchases are added up to total
payout. Again, the results of the GMM(SYS) estimation (52.5%) are very close to the
average total payout ratio (55.8%). Compared to the estimates in columns (1)-(3), the
target payout ratio is only slightly higher, though. This points to the importance of
dividends as the main form of payout for German firms. When comparing the speed
of adjustment, the total payout model yields substantially higher estimates than the
dividends-only model. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H3.4 and indicates
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that (regular) dividends are indeed more sticky than total payouts.
The models discussed thus far implicitly assume that the target payout ratios
and the speed of adjustment are constant throughout the sample period. However,
with the introduction of stock repurchases, (regular) dividends lost in importance. Our
descriptive results in Table 3.2 show a decrease in the average dividend payout ratio
from 56.4% to 44.1%.
Therefore we now turn to a model specification that allows for a structural break
in 1998. The results are shown in Table 3.5. We first consider the dividends-only model
(columns (1)-(3) in Table 3.5). As expected, we find a negative and highly significant
(at the 5% level or better) change in the target dividend payout ratio. Before 1998, the
estimated target payout ratio varies between 0.48 and 0.70 and drops significantly once
stock repurchases became legal (range between [0.19, 0.47]). Estimates for the speed of
adjustment are also lower for the period after 1997. This implies that dividend payouts
became even more sticky once repurchases were allowed. A possible explanation for this
finding is that firms, to a certain extent, used dividends to disburse transitory earnings
prior to 1998 but ceased to do so once repurchases were allowed.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3.5 report the estimates for the total-payout model.22
The results show a substantial decrease in the estimated target total payout ratio
(from 0.79 to 0.49) and a strong increase in the speed of adjustment (from 0.51 to
0.89, all figures relate to the GMM(SYS) estimation) after 1997. These results are
inconsistent with the substitutes hypothesis (H3.1). They rather imply that dividends
and repurchases are not perfect substitutes. Stock repurchases (and potentially also
special dividends) allow for a faster adjustment to temporary changes in earnings,
which is reflected in the faster speed of adjustment during the second half of the
sample period.
22There are 53 cases in which a firm announces that it repurchases shares in order to use the shares
as a means of payment in future acquisitions (“acquisition currency”). When we eliminate the
corresponding 53 firm-year observations we obtain results that are similar to those presented in the
text.
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Table 3.5: The Introduction of Stock Repurchases
Table 3.5 shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-Systems (GMM-SYS)
regressions with dividends per share as dependent variable (regression models 1-3). In addition
we report the results with total payout as the dependent variable (regression models 4-6). The
number of observations is slightly lower for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to
identify whether a special dividend was paid in addition to the regular dividend. The first column
shows the independent variables. Di,t−1 and Si,t−1 are dividends and special dividends per share
paid out in the previous year, respectively. Ri,t−1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share
in the previous year.P represents after-tax earnings per share. For the within-group models the
coefficient for Constant is the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each
cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We introduce a structural break to account
for the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from
1998 onwards which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term. We
test if the sum of the pre-break period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from
zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses;
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter
while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts , , denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order
and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under
the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom
reported in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change
in the accounting standards. The Speed of Adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient
for Di,t−1 (or Di,t−1 + Si,t−1 + Ri,t−1, respectively). The Target Ratio equals the coefficient for
Pi,t divided by the Speed of Adjustment.
Regular dividends Total payout
OLS WG GMM OLS WG GMM
(SYS) (SYS)
Constant 1.102 1.048 0.423 1.276 −0.075 8.807∗∗∗
(1.50) (0.96) (0.42) (1.02) (−0.04) (2.13)
Di,t−1(88− 97) 0.669∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ − − −
(16.77) (27.3) (47.44)
Di,t−1(98− 08) 0.886∗∗∗, 0.735∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ − − −
(2.26) (0.91) (1.14)
Di,t−1 + Si,t−1 + Ri,t−1(88− 97) − − − 0.577∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(15.10) (4.49) (9.11)
Di,t−1 + Si,t−1 + Ri,t−1(98− 08) − − − 0.179 0.080 0.117
(−2.30) (−2.25) (−3.07)
Pi,t(88− 97) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(3.23) (2.93) (25.65) (3.24) (3.05) (3.90)
Pi,t(98− 08) 0.054∗∗, 0.051∗∗, 0.107∗∗∗, 0.346∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(−2.56) (−2.26) (−4.04) (0.38) (0.33) (0.28)
m1 − − −2.74 − − −1.98
m2 − − −0.37 − − −1.23
Hansen (d.f) − − 330.67 − − 339.87
(307) (313)
Observations 3960 3960 3960 3909 3909 3909
Target Ratio (88-97) 0.592 0.486 0.699 0.671 0.523 0.785
Target Ratio (98-08) 0.474 0.192 0.461 0.421 0.358 0.488
Speed of Adj (88-97) 0.331 0.387 0.392 0.423 0.524 0.506
Speed of Adj. (98-08) 0.114 0.265 0.232 0.821 0.920 0.883
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When comparing the dividends-only model (columns (1)-(3)) to the total payout
model (columns (4)-(6)), we find that (as in Table 3.4) the total payout model yields
higher estimates of the speed of adjustment as compared to the dividends-only model.
This adds to the evidence in support of hypothesis H3.4.
In sum, the findings in Table 3.5 indicate that dividends and repurchases are not
considered as (perfect) substitutes by German firms.
As pointed out in section 3.2 a change in taxation in 2001 made repurchases
relatively more desirable for the vast majority of investors. We therefore expect that
target dividend payout ratios decrease after 2001 (hypothesis H3.2). To test this
hypothesis we extend the dividends-only model of Table 3.5 to allow for a tax-induced
structural break in 2002 in addition to the structural break in 1998. The results are
shown in Table 3.6. The coefficient estimates show substantial variation across sub-
periods. We find payouts in later years to be much more rigid, as evidenced by a
significantly lower speed of adjustment after 2001. The estimates of the target payout
ratio are not within an economically meaningful range. The GMM-in-systems estimator
implies a target payout ratio above 100%. Because the model specification with two
structural breaks yields implausible results (possibly because the second sub-period is
very short) we abstain from modeling two structural breaks in our further analysis and
rather focus on the main structural break in 1998.
To gain further insight into the impact of the tax reform on payout decisions we
re-estimate the model for the first sub-period (1988-97) and the last sub-period (2002-
08) separately. The results are also shown in Table 3.6 (specification (4) and (5)). The
target dividend payout ratio is 0.62 in 1988-97 and 0.72 in 2002-08. Thus both the
joint estimation and the separate estimations for the sub-periods yield results which
are inconsistent with H3.2. This hypothesis predicts lower target dividend payout ratios
after the tax reform. Our results thus imply that tax considerations do not seem to
be a (first order) determinant of the payout policy of German firms. This corroborates
evidence reported in Andres et al. (2012).
The analysis thus far showed that the speed of adjustment is generally higher
in a total payout model than in a dividends-only model. This is consistent with the
flexibility hypothesis of Jagannathan et al. (2000). It predicts that changes in dividends
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Table 3.6: The Tax Reform
Table 3.6 shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-Systems (GMM-SYS)
regressions with dividends per share as dependent variable. The number of observations is slightly
lower for models 4-6 because in some cases we were unable to identify whether a special dividend
was paid in addition to the regular dividend. The first column shows the independent variables.
Di,t−1 represents dividends per share paid out in the previous year. P represents after-tax
earnings per share. For the within-group model the coefficient for Constant is the average value
of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and t-
value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for the introduction of stock
repurchases in 1998 and the tax reform in 2001. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998
to 2001 and the period from 2002 to 2008 which is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997)
parameter and a shift term in both cases. We test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter
and the shift term is statistically different from zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift
parameter and the t-value (in parentheses; please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-
break coefficient and the shift parameter while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can
thus be cases where the parameter is positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts
, , denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The statistics m1 and
m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic
is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of
valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses All regressions include year
dummies and a dummy indicating a change in the accounting standards. The Speed of Adjustment
is calculated as one minus the coefficient forDi,t−1 in the respective period. The Target Ratio equals
the coefficient for Pi,t divided by the Speed of Adjustment in the respective period.
Regular dividends
OLS WG GMM GMM GMM
(SYS) (SYS) (SYS)
Constant 1.092 1.129 −0.550 0.221 −2.833∗∗∗
(1.49) (1.03) (−0.63) (0.55) (−2.60)
Di,t−1(88− 97) 0.671∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ −
(16.52) (28.81) (43.20) (30.20)
Di,t−1(98− 01) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗, 0.322∗∗∗, − −
(−1.35) (−1.90) (−1.80)
Di,t−1(02− 08) 1.008∗∗∗, 0.859∗∗∗, 0.941∗, − 0.880∗∗∗
(3.73) (2.88) (3.43) (7.78)
Pi,t(88− 97) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.2888∗∗∗ −
(3.23) (2.85) (31.47) (44.30)
Pi,t(98− 01) 0.041 0.033 0.250∗∗∗ − −
(−2.49) (−2.34) (−0.37)
Pi,t(02− 08) 0.048∗∗, 0.044∗∗, 0.078∗∗, − 0.086∗∗
(−2.35) (−2.01) (−6.00) (2.30)
m1 − − −2.77 −1.67 −1.47
m2 − − −1.02 −1.04 −0.93
Hansen (d.f) − − 308.57 105.87 118.73
(232) (90) (77)
Observations 3960 3960 3960 1648 1494
Target Ratio (88-97) 0.596 0.429 0.607 0.623 −
Target Ratio (98-01) 0.079 0.047 0.381 − −
Target Ratio (02-08) −6.000 0.312 1.322 − 0.717
Speed of Adj (88-97) 0.329 0.420 0.418 0.462 −
Speed of Adj. (98-01) 0.516 0.701 0.678 − −
Speed of Adj. (02-08) −0.008 0.141 0.059 − 0.120
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are related to changes in permanent earnings but are unrelated to changes in temporary
earnings. We now turn to a direct test of this hypothesis (our H3.3). As described above,
we decompose earnings into a permanent and a transitory component (see model (3.8)
above). The model is estimated for dividends only and allows for a structural break in
1998.
The results are shown in Table 3.7. During the first half of the sample period,
the coefficients of both permanent and transitory earnings are positive and highly
statistically significant. The estimated target payout ratios are only slightly lower
for transitory earnings than for permanent earnings. This implies that, prior to
the introduction of repurchases, firms used regular dividends to disburse transitory
earnings.
With the introduction of stock repurchases this picture changes. We observe a
statistically significant structural break for both earnings components. While the target
payout ratio for permanent earnings decreases moderately and insignificantly (from 0.68
to 0.51 for the GMM(SYS) estimation), we observe a substantial and significant (at the
1% level) decrease for temporary earnings, from 0.66 to 0.26 (GMM (SYS)). Thus, in the
period after 1997, the reaction of dividend payouts to changes in transitory earnings
is much weaker than in the pre-1998 period. In addition, the speed of adjustment
decreases after 1997. Both results are consistent with the flexibility hypothesis (H3.3).
Since the introduction of stock repurchases in 1998 firms are equipped with a
more flexible method to disburse transitory earnings and thus do no longer use regular
dividends for this purpose.
By definition, our measure of the transitory component of earnings can be
negative. The flexibility hypothesis, however, implies that only positive deviations in
earnings (i.e. positive transitory earnings) result in (temporary) payouts. We therefore
run additional regressions in which only positive transitory earnings are considered to
explain changes in special dividends and repurchases.
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Table 3.7: Financial Flexibility: Dividends
Table 3.7 shows the results of OLS, within-groups (WG), and GMM-in-Systems (GMM-SYS)
regressions with dividends per share as dependent variable. The first column shows the independent
variables. Di,t−1,PermP represents represents the three year moving average of after-tax earnings
per share based on the years t, t − 1 and t − 2. TransP is equal to the difference between after
tax earnings per share and PermP . For the within-group model the coefficient for Constant is
the average value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated
coefficient and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for the introduction
of stock repurchases in 1998 . We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 to 2008 which
is the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. We
test if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from
zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses;
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter
while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts , , denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order
and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under
the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom
reported in parentheses All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change
in the accounting standards. The Speed of Adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient
for Di,t−1 in the respective period. The Target Ratio Perm (Trans) equals the coefficient for
PermPi,t(TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the Speed of Adjustment in the respective
period.
Regular dividends
OLS WG GMM
(SYS)
Constant 0.592 0.668 −0.041
(1.17) (0.83) (−0.04)
Di,t−1(88− 97) 0.643∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(11.58) (21.94) (20.60)
Di,t−1(98− 08) 0.793∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(1.30) (0.25) (0.59)
PermPi,t(88− 97) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(2.98) (2.96) (10.30)
PermPi,t(98− 08) 0.112∗∗, 0.131∗, 0.168∗∗∗,
(−1.84) (1.55) (−3.13)
TransPi,t(88− 97) 0.194∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(3.30) (2.86) (75.16)
TransPi,t(98− 08) 0.013 0.006 0.085∗∗,
(−2.67) (−2.40) (−5.07)
m1 − − −2.99
m2 − − −0.41
Hansen (d.f) − − 337.28
(315)
Observations 3581 3581 3581
Target Ratio Perm (88-97) 0.577 0.503 0.679
Target Ratio Perm (98-08) 0.541 0.330 0.514
Target Ratio Trans (88-97) 0.543 0.420 0.664
Target Ratio Trans (98-08) 0.063 0.015 0.260
Speed of Adj. (88-97) 0.357 0.433 0.411
Speed of Adj. (98-08) 0.207 0.397 0.327
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Table 3.8: Financial Flexibility: Special Dividends & Repurchases
Table 3.8 shows the results of OLS, within-grpoup, and GMM-in-Systems regressions with with
the sum of special dividends and stock repurchases per share as dependent variable. The first
column shows the independent variables. Si,t−1 are special dividends per share paid out in the
previous year, Ri,t−1 corresponds to the repurchase volume per share in the previous year. PermP
represents the three year moving average of after-tax earnings per share based on the years t, t-1
and t-2. PositiveTransP is equal to the maximum of the difference between after tax earnings per
share and PermP and zero. For the within-group model the coefficient for Constant is the average
value of the fixed effects as obtained from Stata 12. Each cell shows the estimated coefficient
and t-value (in parentheses). The superscripts *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. We introduce two structural breaks to account for the introduction of
stock repurchases in 1998. We report the coefficient for the period from 1998 to 2008 which is
the sum of the pre-break period (1988-1997) parameter and a shift term in both cases. We test
if the sum of the 1988-1997-period parameter and the shift term is statistically different from
zero. We also report the standard t-test for the shift parameter and the t-value (in parentheses;
please note that the coefficient is the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the shift parameter
while the t-statistic is for the shift parameter. There can thus be cases where the parameter is
positive while the t-statistic is negative). The superscripts , , denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The statistics m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order
and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under
the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom
reported in parentheses All regressions include year dummies and a dummy indicating a change
in the accounting standards. The Speed of Adjustment is calculated as one minus the coefficient
for Di,t−1 in the respective period. The Target Ratio Perm (Trans) equals the coefficient for
PermPi,t(TransPi,t) in the respective period divided by the Speed of Adjustment in the respective
period.
Regular dividends
OLS WG GMM
(SYS)
Constant −1.350∗∗ −2.605∗∗ 2.740
(−2.43) (−2.36) (0.52)
Si,t−1 +Ri,t(88− 97) 0.167∗∗ 0.074 0.157
(2.43) (0.66) (2.11)
Si,t−1 + Ri,t(98− 08) −0.034 −0.083 −0.038
(−3.12) (−1.47) (−2.61)
PermPi,t(88− 97) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(4.40) (3.87) (5.36)
PermPi,t(98− 08) 0.124 0.143 0.009
(-0.18) (−0.58) (−0.12)
PositiveTransPi,t(88− 97) 0.060∗∗ 0.060 0.073∗∗∗
(2.21) (1.33) (7.54)
PositiveTransPi,t(98− 08) 0.407 0.444 0.634∗,
(1.18) (1.21) (1.71)
m1 − − −1.37
m2 − − −1.63
Hansen (d.f) − − 296.22
(177)
Observations 3353 3353 3353
Target Ratio Perm (88-97) 0.168 0.211 0.168
Target Ratio Perm (98-08) 0.120 0.132 0.009
Target Ratio Trans (88-97) 0.072 0.065 0.087
Target Ratio Trans (98-08) 0.394 0.410 0.611
Speed of Adj. (88-97) 0.833 0.926 0.843
Speed of Adj. (98-08) 1.034 1.083 1.038
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Table 3.8 contains the results of this specification (model (3.9)). As expected, we
find the speed of adjustment to be very high. This lends further support to the notion
that special dividends and repurchases are used as very flexible means of payouts. In
fact, the estimated speed of adjustment further increases with the introduction of stock
repurchases. Surprisingly, the permanent earnings component has a significant and
positive impact on special dividends before 1998. The coefficient for positive transitory
earnings is also positive (and partly significant), but consistently lower in magnitude.
This implies that special dividends were partly used to pay out permanent earnings. For
the second half of the sample period, though, special dividends and stock repurchases
are not influenced by the permanent component of earnings.
Accordingly, the estimated target payout ratio of permanent earnings falls to
almost zero (for GMM(SYS)). On the other hand, the target payout ratio for the
(positive) transitory component of earnings increases strongly and significantly (at the
10% level), from 0.09 to 0.61 (GMM(SYS)). This can again be interpreted as evidence
in favor of the flexibility hypothesis.
3.6 Conclusion
The Lintner (1956) model, the workhorse of empirical research on corporate payout
decisions, is usually applied to dividend payouts. Against the background of the strong
increase in repurchases this is not necessarily appropriate, though. We argue that a
comparison of Lintner models of dividend payout and total payout can yield insights
into the drivers of the payout decision. In particular it allows us to discriminate among
alternative theories of corporate payout, namely, the substitutes hypothesis, tax-based
explanations, and the flexibility hypothesis. These theories make specific predictions
about the target payout ratios and speed of adjustment coefficients in Lintner models
of dividend payout and total payout.
A distinguishing feature of our dataset is that it spans the introduction of stock
repurchases in Germany in 1998 as well as a tax reform in 2001. This allows us
to analyze how these events affected payout policy. We find that the introduction
of repurchases in 1998 has materially affected the payout policy of German firms.
In particular, both dividend and total target payout ratios decrease. The speed of
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adjustment for dividend payout decreases while the speed of adjustment for total
payout increases. This is inconsistent with the substitutes hypothesis which predicts
that the introduction of repurchases should not alter total payouts. Interestingly, special
designated dividends do not lose importance after the introduction of repurchases.
We find no evidence that German firms have changed their payout policy in
response to the 2001 tax reform. This finding, although surprising at first sight,
is consistent with previous evidence. Andres et al. (2012) document that the tax
preferences of the largest shareholder have no impact on the dividend payout ratios of
German firms.
Our results provide clear support for Jagannathan et al.’s (2000) financial
flexibility hypothesis. We find that dividends are more rigid than total payouts.
This is consistent with the prediction of the flexibility hypothesis that dividends are
predominantly paid out of permanent earnings. We further document that, after the
introduction of repurchases, the responsiveness of dividends to changes in transitory
earnings is reduced substantially. This finding is also supportive of the flexibility
hypothesis.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Abnormal Credit Default Swap Spreads
4.1 Introduction
Academics, financial regulators, and practitioners have shown an increasing interest in
the effect of firm specific, regulatory and macroeconomic events on credit risk pricing.
To that end the event study methodology has been employed on credit default swaps
(CDSs) because this relatively young asset exhibits some distinct advantages over other
credit risk measures. However, the current literature is lacking a clear understanding of
the particularities of event studies employing CDS. Applying a simulation approach
similar to that of Brown and Warner (1985) and Bessembinder et al. (2009), we
therefore examine the statistical properties of CDS data and the performance of current
methods and models used to test for the presence or absence of abnormal changes in
CDS spreads. Furthermore, based on the findings of the literature on the determinants
of CDS changes, we test a CDS four-factor model that captures all potential relevant
pricing factors identified in the literature.
Measuring the impact of any event on stock prices is among the most common
empirical techniques in corporate finance. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) show that
under many conditions the market model and standard parametric tests are well
specified in this research context. In addition, an important strand of the literature
investigates the influence of firm-specific events on debtholder wealth.1 In a recent
paper, Bessembinder et al. (2009, p. 4256) examine the different methodologies used
to detect abnormal bond returns and conclude that “the inferences drawn in previous
studies could in fact be incorrect, depending on the sample size, the magnitude of the
event... and whether parametric or non-parametric tests were used.”
1For an overview, see Bessembinder et al. (2009).
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However, since reliable CDS data has become available from vendors such as
Bloomberg and Markit, a growing literature measuring the impact of corporate events
on debtholder wealth prefers to employ CDS data instead of bond data, among other
things, for the following reasons: First, many bond event studies suffer from the fact
that firms have a variety of bonds outstanding, with different maturities and credit
ratings and differences in liquidity. In such cases, it is not obvious how the different
value changes should be aggregated to gauge the total effect of the event. In contrast,
only one CDS per firm needs to be valued and contract maturities are typically set
to five years2 (Bessembinder et al., 2009). Second, CDS spreads are a pure measure
of credit risk, whereas bond spreads include factors that are unrelated to default risk,
such as interest risk and illiquidity (Longstaff et al., 2005; Callen et al., 2009). Third,
empirical studies such as those of Daniels and Jensen (2005) and Zhu (2006) show that
price discovery occurs first in the CDS market and subsequently in the bond market.
In addition, CDS contracts are more liquid than corporate bonds (Bessembinder et al.,
2009). Given these differences between CDS and corporate bonds, it is understandable
that researchers might—under certain circumstances—favor CDS event studies over
bond event studies.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of previous CDS event studies. This strand of the
literature is relatively young due to the fact that CDS data only became available
about 10 years ago. We aim to provide researchers using CDS data with detailed
knowledge of the performance of a variety of methods that are used to detect abnormal
CDS changes. The evidence presented in this paper should help avoid biased inferences
similar to those documented by Bessembinder et al. (2009) in the context of abnormal
bond returns.
As already investigated by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and Bessembinder
et al. (2009) in the case of stock and bond returns, respectively, the performance of
the different methods depends essentially on two features: The method under scrutiny
should avoid excessive Type I (falsely rejecting the null of no abnormal CDS spread
2In general, data on CDS contracts are available for maturities between six months and 30 years.
However, CDS contracts with a maturity of five years are the most standard and most liquid contracts.
Due to the limited availability of spread data for other maturities, we restrict our analyses to five-year
contracts.
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change when it is in fact true) and Type II (not rejecting the null of no abnormal CDS
spread change when it is in fact false) errors.
Our descriptive results show that the distributional properties of our CDS dataset
are characterized by positive mean spread changes and a positive excess kurtosis
independent of the reference entities’ ratings (investment or non-investment grade), the
region (United States or Europe), and the applied spread change measure (absolute
or relative). These observations indicate that the distribution of realized spread
changes is not normal. The distributional characteristics of abnormal spread changes
similarly show deviations from normality (positive skewness and excess kurtosis).
Consequently, parametric test statistics may lead to biased inferences in CDS event
studies. Furthermore, our findings, (1) that not just the spread level but also the
absolute spread change and (2) the CDS standard deviation are both negatively related
to the reference entities’ ratings, support the notion that relative and not (!) absolute
spread changes should be applied in CDS event studies.
Our main simulation results indicate that only the non-parametric rank test is well
specified when assessing the size of the tests (Type I errors). All other test statistics—
parametric tests in particular—suffer from disproportionate Type I errors. In addition,
similar to the findings of Bessembinder et al. (2009) in the context of abnormal bond
returns, non-parametric test statistics are more powerful in detecting abnormal spread
changes compared to standard parametric tests. However, in contrast to the work of
Bessembinder et al. (2009), our simulations show that the matched portfolio approach
used to calculate abnormal spread changes is the least powerful of all tested models.
Hence, using this model in CDS event studies may lead to biased inferences. Across all
parametric and non-parametric test statistics, the CDS factor model seems to be the
best specified and most powerful model since it exhibits the highest detection rates.
Surprisingly, the simple mean-adjusted approach also leads to very reasonable results
and is recommended if factor information is not available. Our simulation results are
very similar for the investment-grade and non-investment-grade samples. In additional
analyses we follow Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (BMP) (1991) and reexamine the
performance of the different test statistics when introducing an event-induced variance
increase. As expected, only the test of BMP (1991) is consistently well specified
72
under these conditions. However, at least for relatively small variance increases, the
generalized sign and the cross-sectional t-test seem to be well specified.
Several previous studies (e.g. Hull et al., 2004) use a bootstrap approach to control
for the bias that arises if the empirical distributions of test statistics are skewed.
Accordingly, we present simulation results that account for erroneous assumptions
about the empirical distribution of employed test statistics. Overall, the bootstrap
approach only leads to a slight shift of empirical rejection rates toward the theoretical
rates expected under the absence of abnormal performance. The power of the different
test statistics is not affected when using bootstrapped p-values. The previous results
are mainly confirmed since the new CDS four-factor model still outperforms all other
normal return models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CDS
data and specifies the methodology following Brown and Warner (1985). Section 3
describes the different spread measures used in previous papers and discusses their
suitability. Furthermore, we present the models used in our subsequent simulation
study to calculate expected credit default spreads. Section 4 describes the distributional
properties of our initial dataset and analyzes the size and power for each combination
of test statistic and normal CDS spread change model. Section 5 discusses specific
problems in the context of event studies with CDSs, namely, the event-induced variance
increase (Harrington and Shrider, 2007) and the skewness of the empirical distributions
of the test statistics. Section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Data and Simulation Methodology
4.2.1 Data
Credit default swaps are contractual agreements between two parties that protect
against the default risk of a reference entity (in most cases a company). The protection
buyer pays a periodic fee, the spread, to the protection seller. In return, the protection
seller is obligated to compensate the protection buyer if a predefined credit event (e.g.,
default or bankruptcy) happens to the reference entity. Generally, CDS contracts are
standardized under the rules set by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
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(ISDA) and are traded over the counter. They therefore lack the legal reporting and
disclosure requirements of regulated exchanges. Consequently, reliable and complete
information on spreads is not directly observable. This difficulty is compounded by
the fact that neither transnational legal reporting requirements nor international
clearing and settlement standards exist.3 In contrast to stock event studies, a critical
examination of the employed spread data is therefore an inevitable step prior to
measuring abnormal CDS spreads.
Empirical studies on CDS data are based on either a limited set of transaction
and quote data or use composite spreads derived from periodical surveys of major
market participants. Transaction spreads are provided by interdealer platforms (e.g.,
GFI ) or directly out of the book of a single market participant (e.g. Norden and
Weber, 2004) but generally suffer from low reporting frequencies. While it is obvious
that spread data from a single market maker are not representative of the overall
CDS market, Mayordomo et al. (2010) argue that the same may apply to interdealer
platform data. Their major concern is that interdealer data are incomplete, since CDSs
are commonly negotiated via voice transactions. Due to this lack of reliable transaction
and quote data, most empirical studies on CDSs employ composite spreads provided by
specialized data vendors (see column 7 of Table 4.1). The general approach of these data
vendors is based on a collection of book of record data from numerous major market
participants. After cleaning these data for outliers and stale spreads, the remaining
data are aggregated into composite spreads. By construction, these spreads are neither
pure transaction nor quoted spreads. Nevertheless, we believe that composite spreads
are a more representative valuation of the overall CDS market and have an advantages
over spreads derived from interdealer platforms or a single market participant:
In addition to the credit risk of the reference entity, the level of CDS spreads is
potentially affected by the counterparty default risk, i.e. the risk that the swap parties
fail to meet their payment obligations (e.g. Hull and White, 2001; Leung and Kwok,
2004). The amount and direction of the effect will depent on (i) the expected costs of
3Regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe started discussions about the introduction and/or
information sharing of one (or more) central CDS counterparties in 2009.
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replacing a contract (ii) the expected double default4 costs (iii) the default correlation
between the reference entity and the swap parties. In contrast to transaction prices,
the composite spread is not affected by the counterparty risk based on a single market
participant, but is affected by the average counterparty risk in the market. While the
average counterparty risk cleary affects spread levels, it might not affect spread changes
if it is stable over time. We think that this stability assumption rather applies to the
average counterparty risk than to the counterparty risk based on a single set of swap
parties. However, if the event itself has not only an effect on the credit risk of the
reference entity but also on the average counterparty risk, it is difficult to disentangle
both effects.
Even though most data vendors use a similar approach to derive their composite
spreads, Mayordomo et al. (2010) show that composite spreads from different databases
exhibit deviations across firms and in the time-series dimension. Additionally, spreads
reported by different vendors seem to adjust to new information at different speeds.
According to Mayordomo et al. (2010), data from Markit Ltd. and CMA Datavision
lead all other databases in terms of price discovery for European entities. The authors
report comparable results for US entities, except that price data from CMA Datavision
also lead data from Markit Ltd. While differences in price discovery are of minor
importance in a simulation study with artificial abnormal effects, the database selection
can have a substantial influence on the results of an applied event study. Since Markit
Ltd. provides supplementary information for each contract, such as the contractual
standards, the firm’s country of domicile, and the average rating of both Standard and
Poor’s and Moody’s, we use their daily CDS database as our main data source. Markit
Ltd. employs the aforementioned collection and data cleaning processes to construct
their composite spreads. As an additional restriction, they only report composite
spreads whenever the pricing information is based on at least three different market
participants.
Within their daily CDS database, Markit Ltd. provides composite spreads over
the period from January 2001 to July 2011. However, since the ISDA published its
4A double default describes the case were both the reference entity and the protection seller default
simultaneously.
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refined contractual standards for CDSs on February 11, 2003, we do not consider CDS
quotes prior to that date. Within their contractual standards for CDSs, the ISDA
provides alternative definitions of feasible restructuring credit events. While most CDSs
on North American entities follow the so-called modified (frequently referred to as
Mod R) restructuring, CDSs on European entities follow the modified-modified (Mod
Mod R) restructuring convention. Packer and Zhu (2005) show that differences in
the restructuring clause of CDSs can non-negligibly affect their pricing. We therefore
split our sample into two regional subsamples: North America and Europe. Within
each subsample, we only consider corporate single-name contracts with a maturity of
five years, since these are the most actively traded. We further restrict our sample
to contracts written on senior unsecured debt to avoid any bias due to differences in
seniority.
On April 8, 2009, the ISDA issued a supplement to the 2003 ISDA contractual
standards that primarily led to a refinement of the credit event definitions and the
terms of settlement. Two of these changes potentially affect our simulation results:
(i) CDS contracts on North American entities do not include debt restructuring as
a credit event. We therefore consider ex restructuring (XR) contracts for the North
American subsample from the introduction of the supplement onwards. We further
exclude contracts with an event window containing spread changes based on mixed
restructuring clauses. (ii) CDSs are traded with a fixed coupon. For instance, CDSs on
North American entities can be traded with a fixed coupon of 100 or 500 basis points.
Additionally, a variable upfront payment can be used to account for the specific credit
risk of a certain reference entity. However, fixed coupons and upfront payments can
easily be converted into the previously used variable par spread and should therefore
not affect our results. The final North American subsample consists of 2,146,519 daily
quotes denominated in US dollars. The European subsample consists of 1,186,072 daily
quotes denominated in Euros.
Additional data on stock market indices, volatility indices, and swap zero curves
are obtained from Bloomberg. As stock market indices we use the Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) 500 for North America and the DJ Euro Stoxx for Europe. Stock market
volatility is measured by the VIX Index for the North American subsample and the
VSTOXX for the European subsample. As a proxy for the overall level of the zero
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curves we use five-year swap rates denominated in US dollars and Euros. The slope of
each curve is estimated by the difference between the 10-year and one-year swap rates.
4.2.2 Simulation Methodology
We apply Brown and Warner’s (1985) simulation approach to investigate the statistical
properties of different test statistics and normal CDS spread change models. Based on
5,000 randomly drawn samples of realized spread changes, we examine the size and
power for each combination of test statistic and normal CDS spread change model.
We further assess the robustness of our results by varying the sample size and level of
abnormal spread changes. In additional tests we examine how well the different test
statistics behave in the face of event-induced variance and determine the suitability of
bootstrapped p-values as a remedy for the non-normality of spread changes.
In a first step, we generate 5,000 samples consisting of 200 CDS contracts each.
The contracts are randomly selected from our initial dataset. We further assign a
random event date to each contract. There is no general rule as to whether the asset
and event date should be drawn sequentially (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Brown and
Warner, 1980, 1985) or simultaneously (Bessembinder et al., 2009). Moreover, related
studies applying the sequential approach also differ in the order of selecting the asset
and event date. Bessembinder et al. (2009) argue that the optimal random sampling
procedure depends on the specific structure of the underlying database. For the case
of CDSs, the number of tradable contracts as well as the quote frequency increase
over time. We therefore follow the approach suggested by Bessembinder et al. (2009)
and simultaneously select contract–event date combinations. This procedure leads to
samples that are weighted toward later dates and firms that exhibit longer spread
histories.
In unreported results available upon request, we conduct all simulations applying
both sequential methods, but the results are virtually unchanged. We also control
for contracts with insufficient spread data during the event and estimation period.
Each combination of contract and event date must meet the following additional
requirements to remain in a sample: (i) Spread changes must be observable for each
day of the event window, which includes the 41 trading days, from -20 to 20; (ii) spread
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changes must be observable for at least 50% of the estimation window, which includes
the 150 trading days, from -170 to -21; and (iii) the percentage of zero spread changes
should not exceed 10%. If a combination does not meet all the criteria, the observation
is dropped and a new random combination is drawn. Similar to Bessembinder et al.
(2009) this restricition should address potential biases caused by illiquid contracts.5
We repeat this procedure for each sample until we reach the final sample size of 200
contracts.
4.3 Measuring Abnormal CDS Spreads
In this section, we discuss the methodological particularities of event studies employing
CDSs. Column 5 of Table 4.1 shows that different spread change measures are used in
the literature, namely, relative and absolute spread changes. Therefore, we discuss the
suitability of both measures and provide a rationale for the use of relative spreads. We
also briefly review normal return models applied in the classical event study framework
and discuss their adaptation to CDSs. Column 4 of Table 4.1 describes the various
models used to calculate expected spread changes in the prior literature. In addition,
we go beyond these classical models and introduce a (four-) factor model for CDSs.
In our view, it is appropriate to use a specific factor model for expected (i.e., normal)
CDS spread changes, since the recent empirical literature documents the importance
of several determinants not accounted for in classical models. Accordingly, we build
on the factors identified in the empirical literature on CDS spreads when specifying
our factor model. Finally, column 6 of Table 4.1 displays the different test statistics
employed in previous studies. The most prevalent parametric and non-parametric test
statistics used to assess the presence of abnormal spread changes are discussed in the
Appendix B.
4.3.1 Spread Change Measures
In stock or bond event studies, abnormal returns are calculated to measure the impact
of any event on security prices. In contrast, so-called abnormal spread changes are
5We also run all simulations without the third restriction. All results are qualitatively similiar.
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calculated whenever researchers quantify the effect of a firm-specific event on a firm’s
credit risk with the help of CDS data. A spread change measures the change in the
premium of newly issued default swap contracts with constant maturity.6 Independent
of the way spread changes are calculated, an abnormal spread change can be defined
as the realized spread change minus the normal spread change:
∆ASi,τ = ∆Si,τ − E [∆Si,τ |Ωτ ] (4.1)
where ∆ASi,τ , ∆Si,τ , and E [∆Si,τ |Ωτ ] are the abnormal, realized, and normal spread
changes, respectively, for contract i at event date τ . The normal spread change is
the expected spread change conditional on the information set Ωτ (e.g., past spread
changes). In the following we present the different methods to calculate spread changes.
After that we discuss different models for normal spread changes.
Both absolute (Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 2004; Galil and Soffer, 2011)
and relative spread changes (Callen et al., 2009; Shivakumar et al., 2011) are used in
the literature. The daily absolute spread change is simply the daily difference in the
CDS spread:
∆absSi,τ = Si,τ − Si,τ−1 (4.2)
The daily relative CDS spread is the percentage change of daily spreads. We apply
continuous compounding by calculating the difference in the logarithm of daily spreads:
∆relSi,τ = ln (Si,τ )− ln (Si,τ−1) (4.3)
Even though relative spread changes are closer to the concept of returns, early CDS
event studies in particular use absolute spread changes (Hull et al., 2004; Norden and
Weber, 2004). In principle, the application of both calculation methods is correct.
However, the distributional properties using one or the other may be quite different.
This can potentially affect the size and power of the test in the presence of abnormal
spread changes. Furthermore, the economic interpretations of absolute and relative
6Spreads are only reported for newly issued contracts. However, a time series with transaction prices
on a specific contract is necessary to calculate CDS returns. Furthermore, CDS returns differ for
protection buyers and sellers. For a detailed discussion on the calculation of CDSs, see Berndt and
Obreja (2010).
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average abnormal spread changes are different. Therefore, the choice of the right
measure also depends on the expected effect on the firm’s credit risk. For most corporate
events it seems more plausible to expect an event-induced effect on credit risk that is
proportional to the firm’s initial default probability and its loss, given default. In line
with this argument, we recommend the use of relative spread changes as an appropriate
measure in most applications.
4.3.2 Na¨ıve Models
In this section we define two na¨ıve models based on models employed in current stock
and bond event studies.
Mean-Adjusted Spreads
The mean-adjusted model is possibly the simplest normal return model. Brown
and Warner (1985) discuss this model in the context of stock returns. The normal
return is the arithmetic average of realized returns in the estimation period.
Accordingly, the abnormal return of stock i at event date τ is the difference between
the realized return and the estimated mean return. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984)
use a similar model for bonds. Instead of realized bond returns, they calculate returns
in excess of matched Treasury securities. Applying the event study methodology to
CDS data, we estimate the normal return calculating the sample mean spread change
of firm i in the estimation period:
∆Si =
1
150
−21∑
t=−170
∆Si,t (4.4)
Assuming that the normal spread can differ by firm but is constant over time, the
abnormal spread change of firm i at event date τ is
∆ASi,τ = ∆Si,τ −∆Si (4.5)
Brown and Warner (1985) show that short-term stock event studies based on the
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mean adjusted model yield similar results to event studies based on more sophisticated
models such as the market model or the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
However, Bessembinder et al. (2009) cannot confirm this finding for bond event
studies. They document that the mean-adjusted model is the least powerful of all
examined approaches. Therefore, the performance of this model in the context of CDS
event studies is an open question.
Market Model
The market model is the workhorse of stock event studies. This model is a
single-factor asset pricing model based on the assumption of a stable linear relation
between individual stock returns and the return of a broad market index. We adapt
this model to the case of CDS spreads and define the model equation
∆Si,τ = αi + βi∆Sindex,τ + i,τ
E [i,τ ] = 0 V AR[[i,τ ] = σ
2
i
(4.6)
where ∆Sindex,τ is the spread change of the CDS index and i,τ is the zero mean
disturbance term. The daily index spread at time τ is equal to the mean credit default
spreads of all firms in our dataset at time τ .7 The parameters of the market model are
αi, βi, and σ
2
i
. We estimate the model parameters for each firm based on the spread
changes in the estimation period. The abnormal spread change of firm i at event date
τ is, accordingly,
∆ASi,τ = ∆Si,τ − α̂i + β̂i∆Sindex,τ (4.7)
MacKinlay (1997) points out that the ability to detect event effects increases with the
R2 of the market model regressions. This implies that the market model dominates the
mean-adjusted model in terms of size and power if it also exhibits greater explanatory
power for spread changes.
7We calculate separate indices for North America and Europe because of the different restructuring
clauses. We additionally construct an equally weighted index of all (non-)investment-grade contracts
that is used for robustness tests based on the (non-)investment-grade subsample.
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4.3.3 Matching Portfolios
Another technique often applied in bond and long-term stock event studies to generate
normal returns is the matched portfolio approach. The abnormal return is the difference
between the respective firm’s realized return and the return of a reference portfolio.
The reference portfolio contains firms that resemble the event firm in certain risk
characteristics but are assumed to be unaffected by the particular event. While
matching on firm characteristics such as size or the market-to-book ratio is common
for long-term stock event studies (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Barber
and Lyon, 1997), the bond rating is the most important matching criterion in bond
event studies (Asquith and Kim, 1982; Bessembinder et al., 2009). Since CDS spreads
should depend on the expected default probability and the expected loss of the reference
obligation, we adapt the matching to ratings. Therefore, we define the abnormal spread
change as the difference between the realized spread change and the spread change of
a rating-equivalent reference portfolio:
∆ASi,τ = ∆Si,τ −∆SRE,τ (4.8)
where ∆SRE,τ is the spread change of the rating-equivalent portfolio. For each rating
letter we calculate daily spread changes as the average spread change of all available
contracts with the corresponding rating while we exclude event firms for their entire
event period. The rating for each contract is the average issuer rating of S&P and
Moody’s as reported by Markit Ltd.
Bessembinder et al. (2009) recommend applying a value-weighted matched
portfolio approach for bond event studies. Based on their simulation results, they
conclude that this approach combined with non-parametric test statistics is well
specified and dominates all other approaches in terms of power. The reluctance of rating
agencies to make timely rating adjustments (also referred to as rating stickiness), as
documented, for example, by Posch (2011), could be seen as a potential disadvantage
of adopting the portfolio approach to CDS spreads.
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4.3.4 The CDS Factor Model
The three aforementioned approaches are an adaptation of the classical event study
methodology. In them, we implicitly assume that spread changes are sufficiently
explained by common pricing factors. However, researchers have identified additional
important determinants of credit spread changes. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)
investigate the impact of possible determinants of credit risk on bond spread changes.
They derive theoretical determinants of spread changes from structural models of
default. Their findings imply that aggregate factors exhibit a higher explanatory
power than firm-specific factors. Ericsson et al. (2009) conduct a similar regression
analysis with CDSs. They identify leverage, equity implied volatility, and the level of
the Treasury yield curve as major determinants of credit spread changes. Alexander
and Kaeck (2008) apply a regime-switching model to identify the regime-dependent
determinants of CDS index spread changes. In addition to the previous findings, they
document a statistically significant relation between the slope of the risk-free yield curve
and spread changes. Furthermore, they provide evidence that the factor loadings of
major determinants significantly differ in regimes of high-/low-volatility CDS markets.8
Based on these findings, we consider the following market-wide factors as potential
explanatory variables in our factor model: (i) the level of the risk-free yield curve, (ii)
the slope of the risk free yield curve, (iii) the equity implied volatility, and (iv) stock
market performance. We use five-year swap rates as a proxy for the level of the risk-free
yield curve. The difference between 10- and one-year swap rates serves as a proxy for
the slope. We use swap zero curves instead of Treasury zero curves since the results
of Hull et al. (2004), Blanco et al. (2005), and Houweling and Vorst (2005) indicate
that the swap zero curve seems to be the relevant risk-free rate on credit derivative
markets. Following the literature on the determinants of spread changes (e.g. Collin-
Dufresne et al., 2001; Ericsson et al., 2009), we measure the equity implied volatility by
the VIX index for the North American subsample and the VSTOXX for the European
subsample. The stock market index for the North American subsample is the S&P 500.
8We estimate individual model parameters for each firm and consider short time periods. We therefore
do not employ a regime-switching approach. However, researchers conducting long-term event studies
should allow for time-varying model parameters.
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The stock market index for the European subsample is the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx
Index.
An important step in the derivation process of our final factor model is the
identification of potentially redundant variables. Within the estimation window,
multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power of the model as a whole. It
only affects the estimate of the individual factor loadings. However, if the pattern of
multicollinearity in the estimation window differs from that in the event window, the
out-of-sample prediction (abnormal spread changes of the event window) may suffer
from large prediction errors. We therefore calculate the pairwise correlation coefficients
of all the determinants of credit spread changes identified in the literature and test for
multicollinearity using variance inflation factors. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the
pairwise correlation coefficients for relative spread changes. We find that stock market
returns and equity implied volatility are highly correlated, with a correlation exceeding
-70% in both subsamples. Since our tests for multicollinearity based on all variables
also indicate a problem with the variable stock market returns, we drop this variable.9
Table 4.3 provides the variance inflation factors based on the remaining variables.
Since all variance inflation factors are close to one, we find no signs of serious
multicollinearity. Based on the remaining variables, we define the abnormal spread
change of firm i at event date τ as
∆ASi,τ = ∆Si,τ − α̂i − β̂1,i∆Sindex,τ − β̂2,i∆Levelτ − β̂3,i∆Slopeτ − β̂4,i∆V olaτ (4.9)
where ∆Levelτ and ∆Slopeτ are the proxies for the level and slope of the risk-free yield
curve and ∆V olaτ is the proxy of the equity implied volatility.
9In unreported results we also conduct all simulations with the full factor model. The additional factor
does not improve the results.
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Table 4.2: Factor Correlation
Panel A: North America
∆SIndex ∆Level ∆Slope ∆V ola ∆Stock
∆SIndex 1.00
∆Level -0.14 1.00
∆Slope -0.01 0.10 1.00
∆V ola 0.26 -0.25 0.01 1.00
∆Stock -0.29 0.32 0.01 -0.74 1.00
Panel B: Europe
∆SIndex ∆Level ∆Slope ∆V ola ∆Stock
∆SIndex 1.00
∆Level -0.17 1.00
∆Slope 0.03 0.16 1.00
∆V ola 0.36 -0.25 -0.02 1.00
∆Stock -0.41 0.36 0.02 -0.75 1.00
Table 4.3: Variance Inflation Factors
Panel A: All Variables
∆SIndex ∆Level ∆Slope ∆V ola ∆Stock
North America 3.10 1.14 1.01 2.23 4.01
Europe 3.22 1.18 1.03 2.33 5.04
Panel B: Factor Model Variables
∆SIndex ∆Level ∆Slope ∆V ola
North America 1.08 1.09 1.01 1.14
Europe 1.17 1.11 1.03 1.20
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Distributional Properties of CDS Spreads
Before we analyze the size and power for each combination of test statistic and
normal CDS spread change model, we provide a basic description of the distributional
properties of our initial dataset. We examine the distributional characteristics of
realized CDS spread changes and abnormal CDS spread changes to obtain a first
impression about which test statistics might be best suited for the detection of any
firm-specific event’s effect on credit risk.
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for the entire sample based
on relative spread changes. Statistics are further broken down into two subsamples:
investment grade and non-investment-grade reference entities. As a striking first result,
we observe positive mean spread changes for all subsamples. This effect is independent
of the references entities’ rating, region, and applied spread change measure, indicating
a general widening of spreads over our observation period. Because all median
spread changes are equal to zero, the resulting distributions exhibit positive skewness.
Furthermore, we observe a positive excess kurtosis similar to daily stock returns (e.g.
Cont, 2001). These features suggest that realized spread changes follow a non-Gaussian
distribution. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 4.4, the aforementioned distributional
properties largely apply to absolute spread changes, too. However, skewness and
excess kurtosis are much larger when considering absolute compared to relative spread
changes.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics (Realized Spread Changes)
Panel A: Statistics of Relative CDS Spread Changes
(%), 0.01 = 1%
North America
Number of Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive Zero
observations deviation kurtosis spreads spreads
All 2,091,244 0.0002 0.0000 0.0466 1.1860 324 38.4% 22.9%
Investment grade 1,352,614 0.0002 0.0000 0.0158 1.5441 219 39.4% 21.8%
Non-investment grade 738,630 0.0003 0.0000 0.0480 0.6150 480 37.8% 24.9%
Europe
Number of Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive Zero
observations deviation kurtosis spreads spreads
All 1,083,294 0.0004 0.0000 0.0461 1.8442 500 39.3% 19.4%
Investment grade 922,296 0.0004 0.0000 0.0454 1.7884 183 39.3% 19.7%
Non-investment grade 160.998 0.0003 0.0000 0.0495 2.0791 1,786 39.0% 18.0%
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Absolute CDS Spread Changes
(basis points (bps)), 0.01 = 1 bps
North America
Number of Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive Zero
observations deviation kurtosis spreads spreads
All 2,091,244 0.0032 0.0000 0.9520 25.4 18,116 38.4% 22.9%
Investment grade 1,352,614 0.0002 0.0000 0.1570 6.4 5,621 39.4% 21.8%
Non-investment grade 738,630 0.0087 0.0000 1.5884 15.5 6,627 37.8% 24.9%
Europe
Number of Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive Zero
observations deviation kurtosis spreads spreads
All 1,083,294 0.0011 0.0000 0.4336 184.1 167,924 39.3% 19.4%
Investment grade 922,296 0.0008 0.0000 0.1659 347.2 226,328 39.3% 19.7%
Non-investment grade 160,998 0.0034 0.0000 1.0600 78.3 31,309 39.5% 18.0%
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for daily spread changes for the North American and European samples,
as well as for subsamples by issuer rating. Daily CDS spread data are from the daily CDS database of Markit Ltd. and
cover the period from February 11, 2003, to July 31, 2011. Panel A reports the results for the relative spread change
measure. Panel B reports the results for the absolute spread change measure.
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As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the selection of the correct spread change measure
depends on its distributional properties and the assumed event effect. While mean
relative spread changes do not change with the rating, we observe an increase in
mean absolute spread changes as the rating decreases from investment grade to non-
investment grade. This suggests that not just the spread level but also the absolute
spread change is statistically negatively related to the reference entities’ rating. We
also find a negative statistical relation between the rating and the standard deviation.
As already pointed out in Section 4.2.1, these findings support the notion that relative
spread changes should be applied in CDS event studies. This does not necessarily imply
that abnormal CDS spread changes and the related test statistics also suffer from non-
Gaussian distributions. Table 4.5 displays the distributional properties of abnormal
spread changes obtained by using the normal return models described above.
At this point, no abnormal performance has been introduced. Nevertheless, the
results in Table 4.5 show deviations from zero, both for mean and median daily
abnormal spread changes. Compared to the spread changes discussed above, departures
from normality are a little less pronounced for relative abnormal spread changes (Panel
A). However, daily abnormal spread changes still exhibit positive skewness and excess
kurtosis. This indicates that parametric test statistics may yield biased results. In
addition, the distribution of abnormal CDS spread changes seems to differ substantially
across the different normal return models. The CDS factor model seems to produce
the lowest level of standard errors, skewness and excess kurtosis. In contrast, the
matching portfolio approach results in abnormal spreads that exhibit the highest levels
of skewness and excess kurtosis. Concerning absolute CDS spread changes (Panel B),
all models except the CDS market model show comparatively large positive abnormal
spread changes. Skewness and excess kurtosis remain very high for absolute CDS spread
changes.
As discussed above, our main analysis focuses on relative CDS spread changes.10
Moreover, all simulations yield very similar results for the subsamples of investment-
grade and non-investment-grade reference entities.Accordingly, we do not present
10We report results for the empirical size and power of absolute CDS spread changes in Appendix A.
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detailed results for these subsamples. They are available upon request.
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics (Abnormal Spread Changes)
Panel A: Statistics of Relative CDS Spread Changes
(%), 0.01 = 1%
North America
Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive
deviation kurtosis spreads
Mean-adjusted spreads -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0379 1.1 111 48.6%
Market model 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0357 1.1 139 49.3%
CDS factor model 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0062 1.0 59 49.2%
Portfolios (rating) -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0491 1.4 227 49.4%
Europe
Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive
deviation kurtosis spreads
Mean-adjusted spreads -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0378 0.6 85 48.5%
Market model -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0323 1.2 162 48.7%
CDS factor model -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0054 1.1 62 48.9%
Portfolios (rating) -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0493 1.3 267 49.3%
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Absolute CDS Spread Changes
(basis points (bps)), 0.01 = 1 bps
North America
Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive
deviation kurtosis spreads
Mean-adjusted spreads 0.0044 0.0001 1.15 2.2 10,528 50.6%
Market model 0.0047 0.0001 1.16 1.9 10,657 50.8%
CDS factor model 0.0012 0.0002 3.59 1.8 5,373 50.5%
Portfolios (rating) 0.0056 0.0000 1.21 1.6 9,486 48.8%
Europe
Mean Median Standard Skewness Excess Positive
deviation kurtosis spreads
Mean-adjusted spreads 0.0017 0.0000 0.50 343.2 163,039 50.2%
Market model 0.0009 -0.0001 0.49 351.6 168,677 49.5%
CDS factor model 0.0007 0.0000 1.12 334.9 81,364 50.2%
Portfolios (rating) 0.0024 0.0000 0.52 303.4 139,298 47.7%
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for daily relative abnormal spread change for each model
of abnormal spread changes. The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS
contract-event day combinations. We do not add any abnormal performance. Panel A reports the
results for the relative spread change measure. Panel B reports the results for the absolute spread
change measure.
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4.4.2 Size of Tests
We start our main analysis by estimating the empirical size of the different test
statistics. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 contain results for our simulation of 5,000 randomly
drawn samples of 200 abnormal CDS returns and document the probabilities with
which the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance is rejected. Probabilities are
based on a standard t-test (both time series and cross-sectional), the test of BMP
(1991), a rank test, and a generalized sign test. If a test statistic is well specified, the
empirical rejection rate should not deviate significantly from the assumed theoretical
significance level. Considering a two-sided test at the 5% level of significance, this
corresponds to a rejection rate of 2.50% in the lower tail and 2.50% in the upper
tail. We follow the common assumption that the underlying binominal distribution of
success is approximately normal for a large number of trials (Bessembinder et al., 2009;
Campbell et al., 2010) to test whether the empirical rejection rates deviate significantly
from 2.50%. On the basis of 5,000 random samples, the test statistic should be between
2.07% and 2.93% in 95% of cases.11 As Bessembinder et al. (2009), we are primarily
concerned with rejection rates that are too high in the absence of abnormal spread
changes, that is, Type I errors, or overrejections. All combinations of normal return
models and test statistics that yield rejection rates that are significantly higher than
2.93% erroneously show a significant effect of a (non-existent) event on spread changes
and should therefore not be used in CDS event studies. Even though too low a rejection
rate is not directly a problem for the specification of the test statistics, we also mark
significant underrejection in the tables. A rejection rate that is too low under validity
of the null hypothesis of no abnormal return may indicate low power. The results are
reported by region in Table 4.6, with North American spreads in Panel A and European
data in Panel B.
11Under the assumption that the outcomes of each test of the 5,000 trials are independent, the underlying
Bernoulli process implies a mean rejection rate of 0.025 (lower or higher tail of 2.50%), with a standard
deviation of 0.0022 (=
√
0.025× 0.975/√5, 000). The proportion of rejections should hence be between
0.025± (1.96× 0.0022) = 2.07% and 2.93% in 95% of the cases for a significance test at the 5% level.
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Table 4.6: Size of Tests (Relative Spread Changes)
Panel A: North America
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 1.98%* 2.08% 1.60%* 2.16% 2.46%
Market model 2.06%* 1.56%* 1.48%* 2.02%* 3.06%*
CDS factor model 2.76% 1.96%* 1.68%* 2.80% 2.86%
Portfolios (rating) 2.42% 2.66% 3.26%* 2.50% 6.98%*
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 3.10%* 2.32% 2.76% 2.70% 1.86%*
Market model 3.64%* 2.28% 2.90% 2.82% 1.70%*
CDS factor model 5.02%* 2.38% 2.82% 2.78% 2.38%
Portfolios (rating) 3.12%* 1.66%* 1.60%* 2.22% 0.68%*
Panel B: Europe
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 2.24% 2.84% 1.38%* 2.10% 3.14%*
Market model 3.46%* 3.80%* 2.88% 3.06%* 4.94%*
CDS factor model 2.82% 2.32% 1.44%* 2.28% 3.26%*
Portfolios (rating) 2.24% 2.84% 1.38%* 2.10% 4.14%*
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 2.18% 1.92%* 3.02%* 2.42% 1.60%*
Market model 2.42% 0.98%* 1.64%* 1.80%* 1.14%*
CDS factor model 2.64% 2.16% 2.50% 2.14% 1.88%*
Portfolios (rating) 2.18% 1.92%* 3.02%* 2.42% 1.60%*
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for different test
statistics (α = 2.5%, one-tailed). The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS contract-event
day combinations. For the normal approximation of the 5,000 binomial trials the average rejection rate should be between
2.07% and 2.93% (at the 95% confidence interval).
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The result in both panels of Table 4.6 show that only the non-parametric rank test is
well specified for most models. All other test statistics show rejection rates that are
strongly asymmetric and lie outside of the expected range.
In the lower tail, rejection rates are generally too low. On the other hand, most test
statistics reject the null hypothesis too frequently in the upper tail. With the exception
of the test of BMP (1991), however, rejection rates in the lower and upper tails
frequently sum to 5%. The test of BMP (1991) also reveals an asymmetric distribution
but leads to rejection rates that are often too low in both tails. As mentioned above,
this is not directly a problem for the specification of this test statistic but it may point
to a lower power. These findings are robust across regions and credit quality.
With respect to the normal return models, we find that the market model
performs worst in both subsamples, regardless of the test statistic used. In the lower tail,
all test statistics show significant deviations from the theoretical significance level. The
matched portfolio approach performs slightly better. Together with the CDS factor
model and the mean-adjusted model, it shows rejection rates that are consistently
within the expected range for the non-parametric rank test. Again, our results do not
show qualitative differences across the regional subsamples and do not seem to be
affected by credit quality (not reported here but available upon request).
Summarizing the results of the size tests, we find that the non-parametric rank
test is the only test statistic that is well specified across all models and should hence be
used for event studies based on CDS data. The test of BMP (1991) also does not lead
to excessive Type I errors, but we expect low power due to very low rejection rates. In
terms of normal return models, researchers should either use a CDS factor model or,
alternatively, when factor data are not available, the simple mean-adjusted model.
4.4.3 Power of Tests
In this section, we examine the performance of the different models and test statistics
with regard to potential Type II errors (not rejecting the null of no abnormal CDS
spread change when it is false). By introducing positive and negative relative spread
change shocks on day zero of +0.5% and -0.5%, respectively, we observe how frequently
the null hypothesis of no abnormal CDS spread change is correctly rejected. We
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think that a spread change of 0.5% is reasonable as, among others, Shivakumar et al.
(2011) find average abnormal spread changes between 0.2% and 1.5% in the context of
managerial forecast announcements.12
Based on the results displayed in Table 4.7, we document the same empirical
pattern across different regions. Surprisingly and in contrast to the findings of
Bessembinder et al. (2009) in the context of abnormal bond returns, our simulations
show that the matched portfolio approach used to calculate abnormal spread changes
is the least powerful of all models. Hence, using this model in CDS event studies may
lead to biased inferences. Independent of the use of parametric and non-parametric
test statistics, the CDS factor model seems to be the most powerful model since it
exhibits the highest detection rates overall. Similar to the findings of Bessembinder
et al. (2009) in the context of abnormal bond returns, non-parametric test statistics
are more powerful in detecting abnormal spread changes compared to the standard
parametric tests. Given shocks of +0.5% and -0.5%, respectively, the non-parametric
rank test rejects the null hypothesis in at least 98% of the cases across all models. The
power of the generalized sign test is qualitatively similar but performs slightly worse
when positive shocks are introduced. The performance of the simple t-statistics is very
volatile since rejection rates range between 25% and 70%, depending on the CDS model
used. Hence, these are the least powerful test statistics in CDS event studies. The power
of the non-parametric statistic of BMP (1991) is in between the simple test statistics
and the non-parametric test statistics. Its rejection rates range between 55% and 82%.
In sum, we conclude that relying on the CDS factor model and using the non-
parametric generalized sign or rank test is the best method to detect abnormal CDS
spread changes that are in fact true. Alternatively, if, for example, the data to construct
the CDS factor model are not available, researchers can also rely on the mean-adjusted
model since it is also well specified and performs only slightly worse than the CDS
factor model if the non-parametric tests are used.
12Furthermore we think that introducing a shock of +/- 0.5% is “conservative”, since this “artificial”
shock accounts for less than one-third of the daily realized unsigned spread changes (the average
unsigned relative spread change for our European sample is 1.84% and that for our North American
sample is 1.66%).
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Table 4.7: Power of Tests (Relative Spread Changes)
Panel A: North America
Relative CDS Spread Changes: +0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 48.44% 56.84% 75.50% 99.74% 98.88%
Market model 56.82% 63.88% 80.89% 99.70% 98.68%
CDS factor model 59.70% 64.26% 82.53% 99.26% 96.60%
Portfolios (rating) 25.73% 40.88% 55.91% 98.33% 93.66%
Relative CDS Spread Changes: -0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 43.86% 51.82% 61.08% 99.36% 99.30%
Market model 50.14% 56.40% 68.60% 99.46% 99.60%
CDS factor model 51.01% 58.58% 70.35% 99.53% 99.68%
Portfolios (rating) 26.96% 42.22% 57.76% 98.72% 99.86%
Panel B: Europe
Relative CDS Spread Changes: +0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 43.92% 50.28% 74.66% 99.58% 98.26%
Market model 59.52% 63.26% 79.98% 99.54% 97.96%
CDS factor model 60.03% 64.89% 81.06% 99.62% 98.82%
Portfolios (rating) 27.32% 40.26% 55.36% 98.18% 93.38%
Relative CDS Spread Changes: -0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 47.20% 52.42% 60.10% 99.56% 99.48%
Market model 69.14% 70.88% 77.84% 99.76% 99.80%
CDS factor model 70.34% 71.84% 78.65% 99.85% 99.78%
Portfolios (rating) 29.90% 44.54% 59.44% 98.34% 99.78%
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for different test
statistics (α = 5%, two tailed). The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS contract-event day
combinations. We add abnormal spread changes (relative) at day zero of 0.5% and -0.5%.
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Given the above conclusions, we now take into account the fact that the sample
size and level of shocks in CDS event study applications may differ with regard to
the specific event under scrutiny. Therefore, similar to Bessembinder et al. (2009),
we run simulations where the number of observations varies from 50 to 200 and the
abnormal shock varies from -1% to +1%. We apply the CDS factor model, which has
been shown to be the best-performing model in the context of CDS event studies
in our previous analyses. We further restrict our analysis to the test of BMP (1991)
among the parametric tests and the rank test among the non-parametric tests since
both tests perform best in their respective groups. Our goal is to evaluate the power
of the different test statistics under the changing parameters (number of observations
and level of shock). Due to the complexity of the results, they are better presented
in graphical form, as seen in parts (a) and (b) of Figure 4.1. The most important
finding is that the conclusions we draw on the basis of +/- 0.5% shocks hold true for
different sample sizes and different levels of shocks. As Figure 4.1 shows, we observe
that the non-parametric rank test performs substantially better than the parametric
test of BMP (1991) along all different dimensions.
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Figure 4.1: The Power of Tests for Different Sample Sizes.
(a) The BMP (1991) test
(b) The rank test
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4.5 Robustness and Extensions
4.5.1 Event-Induced Variance Increases
Higgins and Peterson (1998) and Harrington and Shrider (2007) argue that almost
any event will induce an increase in cross-sectional variance. This implies that
the variance of abnormal returns is higher in the event window (compared to the
estimation window). It has been shown that such an event-induced increase in variance
can lead to a severe bias of classic test statistics (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1985;
Corrado, 1989; Boehmer et al., 1991). This effect is exacerbated if the estimate of
the variance of abnormal returns is based only on estimation window returns. For the
null of no abnormal return, the event-induced increase in variance will lead to excess
rejection rates. Accordingly, we expect the simple time series t-test in particular to be
misspecified in the presence of event-induced variance increases.
On the other hand, the importance of this potential bias is disputed in the
literature. First, it is not a priori obvious that all events necessarily increase the cross-
sectional variance. Depending on the research setting, the event of interest may even
lower uncertainty, thus leading to lower variance. Brown and Warner (1985, p. 22)
speak of “some types of events” around which returns increase, which also implies that
the type of event matters. Second, even in the presence of event-induced volatility, the
impact on the validity of conventional test statistics may be very limited. As pointed
out by Corrado (2011), the importance of the bias depends critically on whether interest
is in the sample per se or an extraneous population of similar events.13 In many cases,
the sample can be very close to or even be the population itself (e.g., in the case of
historical events). In these cases, where interest is in the mean event-induced return,
variance increases are not relevant by definition. Test statistics that account for event-
induced variance increases only become important if interest is in the population, that
is, when inferences beyond the sample mean to the population mean are required.
Corrado (2011, pp. 218-219) concludes,
13See Corrado (2011, p.216) for an extensive discussion.
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“A perusal of the finance literature suggests that many event studies limit
themselves to statistical inferences about the mean event-induced return within
the sample ... without projecting inferences onto the mean return of a
parent population. This may suggest a conservative bias; however, this bias is
diminished by the inevitable follow-up studies with extended data sets that form
ongoing streams of research into interesting and important topics. Nevertheless,
projecting inferences onto a population larger than the sample can often be
instructive. In forming these inferences, cross-sectional variance adjustment
procedures advanced in BMP (1991), Sanders and Robins (1991), or Corrado
and Zivney (1992) are aptly recommended.”
It is thus up to the researcher to decide whether the issue is important in a specific
research setting. As a next step, we therefore model an event-induced variance increase
and reexamine the performance of the different test statistics. Following the literature
(e.g. Brown and Warner, 1985; Boehmer et al., 1991), we assume that the variance
increases proportionally to the variance of abnormal returns in the estimation window.
In most applications, the variance estimator of the individual time series is used. BMP
(1991), however, additionally consider the average variance across all observations in
the estimation window. In our simulation, we apply both methods. A constant shock µ
as well as a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and a variance that
is proportional to the variance of the estimation window (σ2) are added to the realized
abnormal spread change:
µ+ x with x ∼ N(0, kσ2) (4.10)
with k standing for the proportionality factor. BMP (1991) derive economically
plausible values for this factor based on several empirical papers (Charest, 1978;
Mikkelson, 1981; Penman, 1982; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) and conclude that values
for k should lie in a range between 0.44 und 1.25. Accordingly, we use values of 0, 0.5,
1, and 1.5, with k = 0 standing for no increase in event-induced variance.
In line with our expectations, the findings in Table 4.8 indicate that the test of
BMP (1991) is the only test statistic that is consistently well specified for a variance
increase within an economically plausible range. All other test statistics reject the null
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of no abnormal return too frequently. As an exception, the generalized sign test and
the cross-sectional t-test seem well specified, at least for comparatively low variance
increases. The results of the power test in Table 4.9 further show that the power of
the different test statistics decreases significantly with increases of the proportionality
factor k. Given the comparatively low magnitude of the shock (+/- 0.50%), the power
of all tests seems to be very low for values of k that exceed 0.5. Rejection rates for
both the test of BMP (1991) and the non-parametric tests only become reliable for
shocks larger than +/- 1% (results not tabulated here but available upon request).
To summarize the size and power tests in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, the test of BMP (1991)
seems to be the only test that produces reliable results in the presence of event-induced
variance increases.
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Table 4.8: Event-Induced Variance and Size of Tests
Panel A: Event-Induced Variance Proportional to Individual Security
Estimation Window Variance
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 2.76% 1.96%* 1.68%* 2.80% 2.86%
k=0.5 3.88%* 2.96%* 2.86% 4.28%* 2.16%
k=1.0 9.88%* 3.04%* 2.92% 5.94%* 2.19%
k=1.5 19.73%* 3.64%* 3.41%* 7.30%* 2.89%
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 3.02%* 2.38% 2.82% 2.78% 2.38%
k=0.5 3.75%* 2.30% 2.04%* 3.84%* 2.74%
k=1.0 6.80%* 2.98%* 2.41% 7.30%* 3.35%*
k=1.5 11.00%* 3.64%* 3.95%* 8.53%* 3.61%*
Panel B: Event-Induced Variance Proportional to Average
Estimation Window Variance
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 2.76% 1.96%* 1.68%* 2.80% 2.86%
k=0.5 3.59%* 1.91%* 1.86%* 4.17%* 2.14%
k=1.0 9.13%* 2.90% 2.23% 6.29%* 2.97%*
k=1.5 19.56%* 4.11%* 2.49% 7.61%* 3.04%*
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 3.02%* 2.38% 2.82% 2.78% 2.38%
k=0.5 4.41%* 2.38% 2.84% 6.03%* 2.67%
k=1.0 7.01%* 2.29% 2.86% 8.06%* 3.33%*
k=1.5 9.12%* 2.85% 2.89% 9.67%* 3.56%*
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for
different test statistics (α = 2.5%, one-tailed). The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly
drawn CDS contract-event day combinations. For the normal approximation of the 5,000 binomial trials
the average rejection rate should be between 2.07% and 2.93% (at the 95% confidence interval).
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Table 4.9: Event-Induced Variance and Power of Tests
Panel A: Event-Induced Variance Proportional to Individual Security
Estimation Window Variance
Relative CDS Spread Changes: +0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 59.70% 64.26% 82.53% 99.26% 96.60%
k=0.5 49.72% 48.32% 69.75% 92.42% 80.69%
k=1.0 44.56% 27.28% 50.86% 74.54% 53.14%
k=1.5 40.64% 12.72% 33.54% 58.14% 32.87%
Relative CDS Spread Changes: -0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 51.01% 58.58% 70.35% 99.53% 99.68%
k=0.5 54.58% 51.00% 72.98% 95.10% 82.86%
k=1.0 48.80% 29.18% 54.38% 78.08% 53.50%
k=1.5 42.68% 15.18% 34.74% 60.90% 35.76%
Panel B: Event-Induced Variance Proportional to Average
Estimation Window Variance
Relative CDS Spread Changes: +0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 59.70% 64.26% 82.53% 99.26% 96.60%
k=0.5 53.07% 46.38% 55.65% 82.65% 58.32%
k=1.0 44.02% 25.09% 26.90% 52.88% 28.30%
k=1.5 41.33% 12.67% 13.70% 35.97% 16.47%
Relative CDS Spread Changes: -0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
k=0.0 51.01% 58.58% 70.35% 99.53% 99.68%
k=0.5 54.58% 51.00% 72.98% 95.10% 82.86%
k=1.0 48.80% 29.18% 54.38% 78.08% 53.50%
k=1.5 42.68% 15.18% 34.74% 60.90% 35.76%
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for
different test statistics (α = 5%, two tailed). The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly
drawn CDS contract-event day combinations. We add abnormal spread changes (relative) at day zero of
0.5% and -0.5%.
101
4.5.2 Bootstrapped p-Values
If we take our simulation of event-induced variance increases into account, no single
test statistic seems to be consistently well specified. In addition, parametric tests suffer
from low power in detecting abnormal spread changes. This is mainly due to the fact
that the empirical distributions of our test statistics are skewed, which contradicts the
assumption of the normal distribution. Hull et al. (2004), without providing evidence,
suggest a bootstrap approach to control for this bias. In a similar setting, Barber et al.
(1999) show that even a skewness-adjusted t-test of abnormal buy-and-hold returns
deviates from its theoretical distribution under validity of the null hypothesis. The
authors argue that a simple bootstrap method will lead to much improved results.
We adopt this approach for the case of CDSs. To do so, all abnormal announcement
day spread changes are adjusted by their corresponding means. In the next step,
1,000 random samples of size n/2 are generated from the original test statistic.14 This
procedure results in an empirical approximation of the null distribution.
The results in Table 4.10 show that bootstrapped p-values consistently lead to
rejection rates that are within the theoretically expected range. This holds across
all normal return models. The asymmetry documented in Section 4.2 is no longer
present, irrespective of regional subsamples. While bootstrapping apparently leads to
large improvements in model specification, the power of the different test statistics is
not positively affected. As Table 4.11 shows, the rejection rates remain comparatively
low. However, in contrast to the results presented in Section 4.4.3, the rejection rates
are roughly similar for positive and negative shocks of the same magnitude. Again, the
CDS factor model slightly outperforms other normal return models.
14As a robustness test, we use a random sample of size n/4. All results are virtually identical.
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Table 4.10: Bootstrapping and Size of Tests
Panel A: North America
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 2.46% 2.49% 2.42%
Market model 2.62% 2.21% 2.62%
CDS factor model 2.58% 2.36% 2.59%
Portfolios (rating) 2.43% 2.26% 3.16%*
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 2.46% 2.51% 2.68%
Market model 2.62% 1.96%* 2.62%
CDS factor model 2.58% 2.13% 2.63%
Portfolios (rating) 2.86% 2.16% 1.73%*
Panel B: Europe
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 2.51% 3.08%* 2.41%
Market model 2.54% 2.12% 2.56%
CDS factor model 2.58% 2.76% 2.44%
Portfolios (rating) 2.40% 2.60% 2.16%
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 2.50% 2.96%* 2.64%
Market model 2.51% 2.58% 2.61%
CDS factor model 2.54% 2.23% 2.53%
Portfolios (rating) 2.40% 1.96%* 2.60%
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance for different test statistics (α = 2.5%, one-tailed). The results are based on
5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS contract-event day combinations. For the
normal approximation of the 5,000 binomial trials the average rejection rate should be
between 2.07% and 2.93% (at the 95% confidence interval).
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Table 4.11: Bootstrapping and Power of Tests
Panel A: North America
Relative CDS Spread Changes: +0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 47.48% 56.42% 74.64%
Market model 64.57% 61.76% 75.81%
CDS factor model 66.00% 63.67% 76.51%
Portfolios (rating) 24.77% 41.27% 56.29%
Relative CDS Spread Changes: -0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 43.68% 51.32% 61.36%
Market model 63.19% 60.55% 76.52%
CDS factor model 65.99% 63.86% 75.91%
Portfolios (rating) 27.13% 41.74% 57.70%
Panel B: Europe
Relative CDS Spread Changes: +0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 50.45% 47.39% 72.01%
Market model 63.28% 67.43% 80.95%
CDS factor model 65.02% 68.47% 81.42%
Portfolios (rating) 27.74% 40.77% 53.98%
Relative CDS Spread Changes: -0.50%
t-Test t-Test BMP
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 54.88% 52.99% 62.14%
Market model 64.72% 68.99% 79.66%
CDS factor model 66.92% 69.38% 81.29%
Portfolios (rating) 30.27% 44.24% 59.86%
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance for different test statistics (α = 5%, two tailed). The results are based on
5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS contract-event day combinations. We add
abnormal spread changes (relative) at day zero of 0.5% and -0.5%.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper extends the findings of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and Bessembinder
et al. (2009) by applying their simulation approach in the context of stock and bond
returns to CDS spread changes. We provide evidence as to which models and test
statistics are best suited for empirical applications that investigate the impact of
firm-specific or macroeconomic events on firm credit risk. We measure credit risk by
examining the change in value of firm CDSs.
Our main finding is that when employing daily CDS data, the non-parametric
rank test is the only test statistic that performs well across all models with regard to
the avoidance of excessive Type I and II errors. Some of the classical normal return
models such as the market model or the matching portfolio approach are only poorly
specified. A CDS four-factor model based on the findings of the previous literature on
CDS spreads is generally well specified and performs best in detecting abnormal CDS
spreads. Surprisingly, the simple mean-adjusted approach also leads to very reasonable
results and is recommended if data on the different factors are not available.
In additional analyses we follow BMP (1991) and reexamine the performance
of the different test statistics when introducing an event-induced variance increase.
As expected, only the test of BMP (1991) is consistently well specified under these
conditions. However, at least for relatively low variance increases, the generalized sign
and cross-sectional t-test seem to be well specified.
Since several previous studies (e.g. Hull et al., 2004) use a bootstrap approach,
we also present results for simulations accounting for the fact that the results may be
biased because of inappropriate assumptions about the empirical distribution of the
test statistics employed. Overall, the power of the different test statistics is not affected
when using bootstrapped p-values. The previous results are mainly confirmed as the
CDS four-factor model outperforms all other normal return models.
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A Appendix to Chapter 4
A.1 Absolute Spreads
Table A.1: Size of Tests (Absolute Spread Changes)
Lower tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 4.50%* 0.76%* 0.42%* 1.06%* 0.52%*
Market model 4.68%* 0.78%* 0.72%* 1.98%* 1.44%*
CDS factor model 2.94%* 4.46%* 1.06%* 2.20% 2.50%
Portfolios (rating) 4.64%* 1.36%* 3.68%* 3.94%* 7.90%*
Upper tail (2.5%)
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 7.28%* 1.68%* 6.78%* 4.04%* 7.58%*
Market model 7.46%* 1.72%* 4.08%* 3.30%* 3.46%*
CDS factor model 4.04%* 1.74%* 4.10%* 3.80%* 2.66%
Portfolios (rating) 6.18%* 0.84%* 1.45%* 1.50%* 0.60%*
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for different test
statistics (α = 2.5%, one-tailed). The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS contract-event
day combinations. For the normal approximation of the 5,000 binomial trials the average rejection rate should be between
2.07% and 2.93% (at the 95% confidence interval).
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table A.2: Power of Tests (Absolute Spread Changes)
Absolute CDS Spread Changes: +0.5 bps
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 8.28% 5.50% 87.02% 100.00% 100.00%
Market model 8.78% 5.72% 87.00% 100.00% 100.00%
CDS factor model 4.36% 6.34% 88.60% 100.00% 100.00%
Portfolios (rating) 7.04% 4.08% 86.80% 100.00% 99.70%
Absolute CDS Spread Changes: -0.5 bps
t-Test t-Test BMP Rank Generalized sign
(time-series) (cross-section)
Mean-adjusted spreads 5.38% 2.98% 66.10% 100.00% 99.86%
Market model 5.66% 3.00% 73.40% 100.00% 99.96%
CDS factor model 5.86% 3.12% 74.58% 100.00% 99.98%
Portfolios (rating) 5.46% 6.54% 82.98% 100.00% 100.00%
Notes: This table reports the day zero rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for different test
statistics (α = 5%, two tailed). The results are based on 5,000 replications of 200 randomly drawn CDS contract-event day
combinations. We add abnormal performance at day zero of +0.5 and -0.5 bps.
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A.2 Test Statistics
Besides the selection of an appropriate spread change measure and a model of
normal spread changes, a well-specified test statistic must be defined. The following
discusses the adaptation of several parametric as well as non-parametric test statistics
used in classical event studies to the case of CDS spread changes. All parametric
test statistics are built upon the same null hypothesis. Under the validity of the null
hypothesis, the average abnormal spread change on the event day should be equal to
zero:
H0 : ∆AAS0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆ASi,0 = 0 (A.1)
If the event of interest induces an abnormal spread change that is significantly different
from zero, the null hypothesis should be rejected. Since the direction of the event-
induced spread change is unknown (ex ante) in most applications, it is common to apply
two-tailed tests. A simple t-test can be derived from the assumption that abnormal
spread changes are independent and identically normally distributed. The test statistic
equals the quotient of the average abnormal spread change and its estimated standard
deviation:
t =
∆AAS0
S(∆AAS0)
(A.2)
The statistic follows a t-distribution with N - D degrees of freedom, where N denotes
the number of events and D the number of parameters of the normal spread change
model. The distribution of the test statistic is asymptotically normal in sufficiently
large samples. The estimated standard error is based on the estimation window
observations.15
This simple t-test may lead to biased inferences whenever an event induces a
variance increase in the spread changes. An estimation of the standard deviation based
on the estimation window observations is most likely downward biased in that case.
Thus, a valid null hypothesis is rejected too often. Brown and Warner (1985) propose
to estimate the standard deviation from the cross section of the event window. For the
15Since the standard deviation is estimated from the estimation window observations, the estimator
should be adjusted for forecast errors. The adjustment depends on the model of normal spread changes.
We calculate all test statistics with the appropriate forecast error adjustments within our simulation.
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case of CDSs, the cross-sectional test is accordingly defined as
tCS =
∆AAS0
SCS(∆AAS0)
(A.3)
SCS(∆AAS0) =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
(
N∑
i=1
∆ASi,0 −∆AAS0
)2
(A.4)
Another parametric test is the standardized residuals test introduced by Patell (1976)
. The major difference from the previous test is the standardization of abnormal spread
changes before calculating the average value:
∆AS∗i,0 =
∆ASi,0
S(∆ASi)
(A.5)
tP =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆AS∗i,0
√
N(D − 4)
D − 2 (A.6)
where ∆AS∗i,0 denotes the standardized abnormal spread changes, N is the number of
events, and D is the number of parameters of the normal spread change model. The
standardization leads to an equal weight for each event. Since the Patell (1976) test
is not well specified for an event-induced variance increase, we apply the test of BMP
(1991). This test is a hybrid of the Patell (1976) and cross-sectional tests that is robust
to event-induced variance increases. The test statistics can be constructed by applying
the cross-sectional test to standardized abnormal spread changes:
tBMP =
∆AAS∗0
SCS(∆AAS∗0)
(A.7)
SCS(∆AAS
∗
0) =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
(
N∑
i=1
∆AS∗i,0 −∆AAS∗0
)2
(A.8)
where ∆AAS∗0 denotes the average of the standardized abnormal spread changes
on the event day.
All aforementioned tests rely on the assumption that abnormal spread changes
are normally distributed. However, this assumption does not seem feasible when a
distribution exhibits substantial skewness and/or excess kurtosis. In that case non-
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parametric test statistics can be used instead. The Corrado (1989) rank test and the
generalized sign test proposed by Cowan (1992) are commonly used in event studies.
The rank test is based on the transformation of abnormal spread changes into
ranks for each time series:
Ri,τ = rank [ASi,τ ] (A.9)
Tied ranks should be treated by the method of midranks according to Corrado (1989).
We further correct for missing observations, as proposed by Corrado and Zivney (1992),
based on a uniform transformation of ranks:
Ui,τ =
Ri,τ
1 +Mi
(A.10)
where Mi denotes the number of non-missing observations for time series i. Under the
validity of the null hypothesis, the average of the transformed rank should not deviate
significantly from 0.5. Based upon this assumption, the test statistics is defined as
tRank =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Ui,τ − 0.5
S(U)
(A.11)
S(U) =
1
T
∑
τ
1
N2
N∑
i=1
[Ui,τ − 0.5]2 (A.12)
The generalized sign test is derived from the proportion of positive and negative
abnormal spread changes on the event date. Under the validity of the null hypothesis,
this proportion should not differ from the proportion of positive and negative abnormal
spread changes of the estimation windows:
tSign =
p+0 − p+est√
1
N
p+est(1− p+est)
(A.13)
where p+0 and p
+
est are the percentages of positive abnormal spread changes on the
event date and in the estimation window, respectively.
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